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ABSTRACT 
 
TOWARD SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS: SCHOOL QUALITY & THE 
EQUITABLE REVITALIZATION OF NEIGHBORHOODS 
 
Kenneth Steif 
 
Eugenie Birch 
 
High housing costs and variation in the willingness to pay for school quality helps 
foster regional income inequality across space and the relegation of low-income 
families to neighborhoods with low quality schools.  This dynamic in part, 
explains why Philadelphia’s public school system has failed; why its children are 
under-educated and why despite renewed demand for housing in certain 
neighborhoods, the City still struggles economically.  Nevertheless, this research 
demonstrates econometrically that Philadelphia households are willing to pay a 
significant price premium to live in neighborhoods with high quality public 
schools.  This fact is used to motivate a new intervention that leverages the 
housing investment of the middle-class to realign the supply of and demand for 
public goods like neighborhood schools.  The proposed program repurposes the 
Improvement District framework to fund new local school quality.  The equity 
component of the plan, it is argued, can potentially break the spatial pattern of 
income segregation by fostering mixed-income neighborhoods and diminish the 
threat of displacement which will likely occur as new school quality is capitalized 
in to local home prices.  It is concluded that schools are more than drivers of 
human capital development, they are also engines of neighborhood economic 
development as well.  
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Abstract ......................................................................................................... iv 
List of Tables ................................................................................................. vi 
List of Illustrations ......................................................................................... vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ........................................................................ 11 
Chapter 3: The University of Pennsylvania & the Penn Alexander School ... 47 
Chapter 4: Research Design ........................................................................ 54 
Chapter 5: Estimating the willingness to pay for good schools ..................... 80 
Chapter 6: Planning School Improvement Districts .................................... 100 
Chapter 7: Conclusion ................................................................................ 119 
Appendix 1: School outcomes and racial diversity ...................................... 128 
Appendix 2: School Improvement District policy brief ................................. 144 
Appendix 3: Interview questions ................................................................. 149 
Bibliography ................................................................................................ 152 
Index ........................................................................................................... 171 
  
vi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 4.1: Decision Factors 
Table 5.1: Summary statistics. 
Table 5.2: Results estimated from the model in Equation 4.2 
Table 5.3: Findings from other papers using similar research designs. 
Table 5.4: Home prices as a function of distance to the Penn Alexander 
catchment by year 
Table 5.5: Results of the regression described in Equation 4.3 
Table 6.1: Estimated new tax revenues/burdens generated from most suitable 
school catchments (5th Quintile) 
Table T.1.1: Summary statistics for school year 2011-2012 
Table T.1.2: Regression summary for reading scores 
Table T.1.3: Regression summary for math scores 
Table T.1.4: Regression summary for reading scores using percent white as 
coefficient of interest 
Table T.1.5: Regression summary for math scores using percent white as 
coefficient of interest 
 
 
  
vii 
 
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
Figure 3.1: The Penn Alexander School catchment 
Figure 4.1: Elementary school catchment areas 
Figure 4.2: Distances from catchment boundaries 
Figure 4.3: Mean test scores by school catchment: ‘No Data’ refers to non-
traditional public school catchments including neighborhood charters. 
Figure 4.4: The weighted overlay technique. 
Figure 5.1: Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test 
score side of a catchment boundary. 
Figure 5.2: Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test 
score side of a catchment boundary broken out by test score quartiles. 
Figure 5.3: Statistically significant boundary fixed effects overlaid on mean test 
scores. 
Figure 5.4: Pairwise test score/home price regressions, 2008-2012  
Figure 5.5: Mean price per square foot of home inside and outside the Penn 
Alexander catchment. Error bars represents the standard error around the mean 
price per square foot. 
Figure 5.6: Inflation adjusted home prices as a function of distance to the Penn 
Alexander catchment by year 
Figure 5.7: Non-transformed annual price premium estimations and their 95% 
confidence intervals 
Figure 6.1: Site suitability decision factors in vector GIS form  
Figure 6.2: Site suitability decision factors in raster GIS form  
Figure 6.3: Final site suitability index and mean index by school catchment 
Figure 6.4: Most suitable school catchments (5th Quintile) 
Figure T.1.1: Histogram of school diversity for school year 2011-2012 
Figure T.1.2: Histogram of percent white for school year 2011-2012 
Figure T.1.3: Spatial distribution of Diversity (D) statistic for elementary schools 
in Philadelphia 
Figure T.1.4: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA 
math tests, 2011-2012 
Figure T.1.5: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA 
reading tests, 2011-2012 
Figure T.1.6: Residual vs. predicted plot for Reading Score regression 8 (with zip 
code fixed effects) 
Figure T.1.7: Residual vs. predicted plot for Math Score regression 8 (with zip 
code fixed effects) 
  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
With enough investigation, it becomes clear that education is among the few 
policy mechanisms that can solve the city’s most chronic dilemma - 
intergenerational poverty.  The dearth of educational opportunities in cities has 
reached cancerous proportions, perpetuating segregation and stifling upward 
mobility1.  This research investigates how school quality affects the economic 
vitality of urban neighborhoods and the people who reside there.  Failed schools 
are often exemplified in cities, working in combination with other symptoms of 
poverty to paint a vivid portrait of urban decline.  Although education is a national 
agenda topic, failed schools, lackluster academic outcomes and new avenues for 
reform have generated fierce debate over the future urban education in cities like 
Philadelphia, Chicago and New Orleans.  What dynamics are to blame and what 
if anything can planning do to remedy the situation? 
 
In 1977, the College Board, the group that administers the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test (SAT), published a report claiming "No topic related to the programs of the 
College Board has received more public attention in recent years than the 
unexplained decline in scores earned by students on..." the SAT.  Among a slew 
of potential causes, the report claimed that two-thirds to three-fourths of overall 
test score declines can be attributed to an increase in minority student test 
takers.  The authors conclude that “what decline reflects is the incompleteness 
                                                          
1
 Chetty et al, 2013 
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so far, of the national undertaking to afford meaningful equality of educational 
opportunity2." 
 
In another call to arms, a 1983 report by the U.S. Department of Education 
entitled "A Nation at Risk" exclaimed, "If an unfriendly foreign power had 
attempted to impose on America the mediocre education performance that exists 
today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war.  As it stands we have 
allowed this to happen to ourselves3."  
 
That education decline is akin to a foreign act of hostility is more than just colorful 
rhetoric.  Thirty years after “Nation at Risk”, the evidence still suggests that many 
of our students, even those in the highest performing states still struggle to 
compete with top performing countries in math and science4.  There are serious 
economic repercussions of these inadequacies, particularly given the 
tremendous private returns to education.  Across a multitude of studies, the 
average return for one additional year of education in the U.S. is a staggering 
10%5.  A decline in this rate of return could easily strangle U.S. economic output 
and degrade our influence on the international stage.   
 
The economics of agglomeration provide motivation for why this return is critical 
for the success of cities as well.  It takes a critical mass of educated individuals to 
                                                          
2
 College Board (1977) 
3
 National Commission on Excellence in Education (1983) 
4
 National Center for Educational Statistics (2013) 
5
 Psacharopoulis & Patrinos (2004) 
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produce enough economic activity for a city to prosper.  Historically, it has been 
very difficult to untangle to the effect of cities on human capital development.  It 
could be that productive places generate productive workers or that productive 
places attract productive workers6.  We know that there is a positive correlation 
between city size and learning effects7 but there's also casual evidence linking 
the existence of educational assets in cities with higher wage earners8. 
 
Aside from institutional factors, peer effects play a role as well.  Workers in cities 
with higher proportions of college graduates see their wages increase at a faster 
rate over time than workers in less educated cities9.  This means that 
independent of your actual job, whether you're a gas station attendant, barista or 
insurance salesman - your salary is dependent, in part on how well educated 
other people in your city are.   
 
With this evidence at hand, it is astounding that contemporary urban economic 
development policy is still focused on attraction strategies defined by buzzwords 
like ‘Creative Class’ and ‘Innovation Districts’10.  While these mechanisms may 
be effective for luring young, skilled workers to cities, it is disappointing that equal 
emphasis has not been put on growing human capital at home.  In fact, it is 
                                                          
6
 Henderson (2003) 
7
 Glaeser & Mare (2001) 
8
 Knowing that existence of universities in a city is highly correlated with education outcomes, Moretti (2004) compares 
city-level outcomes for cities endowed with land grant colleges to those without.  The assumption is that "having a 
university may simply be the effect, not the cause of a skilled populace", but land grant colleges, which established by the 
Federal Government and were not contingent local city conditions, make a plausible control group.  He finds that the 
presence of a land grant college results in a significant increase in both college graduates and wages. 
9
 Moretti (2012) 
10
 Florida's (2002); Katz & Wagner (2014) 
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surprising generally, that more emphasis isn’t given to education as a driver of 
economic development11.   
 
Some basic employment figures suggest that this may be an oversight on behalf 
economic development planners.  Nationally, the five largest unified school 
districts with respect to spending - New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, Dade 
County, Fl., and Philadelphia, averaged more than $9 billion worth of 
expenditures in 2011.  These institutions are regional employment powerhouses.  
In 2011, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Chicago employed 63,708; 23,451 and 
27,539 teachers and staff respectively 12.  And while these entities pump billions 
in to the economy, public schools in urban areas are still characterized by poor 
teacher quality, lackluster teaching environments (physical plant, etc.) large class 
sizes, a dearth of technology, low academic achievement and funding levels that 
are unable, at least at their current levels, to overcome the burden of 
concentrated intergenerational poverty13. 
 
Furthermore, the achievement gap between high and low-income students is 
30%-40% greater today than it was twenty-five years ago14, and students living in 
urban areas exhibit higher dropout rates and lower achievement than their 
suburban peers15.  These conditions fuel a negative feedback cycle where low 
                                                          
11
 There is likely more attention paid to higher education as a means of economic development.  In the context of this 
research, the reference is more to primary and secondary education. 
12
 National Center for Education Statistics (2013) 
13
 Anyon (2005) 
14
 Reardon (2011) 
15
 Roscigno et al (2006) 
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quality schools yield ill-prepared students who grow up to earn disproportionally 
lower wages and are forced to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods with low-
quality schools.  What makes these dynamics even more dangerous is that these 
outcomes effect both human capital potential of individuals and the economic 
potential of entire neighborhoods.  Without breaking this feedback cycle, the 
likely fate of these places is either continued stagnation and decline or increased 
economic inequality. 
 
In Philadelphia, these realities front newspaper and blog pages on a daily basis.  
The Philadelphia School District is wrestling with a $400 million deficit.  To close 
the gap, in March of 2013, the school district voted to close 23 schools16.  The 
following June, Superintendent William Hite announced the layoffs of 3,700 
employees - nearly 20% of the total District workforce, including teachers, 
secretaries, counselors, assistant principals, secretaries, librarians and others17.  
At a press conference, Superintendent Hite said, "The School District of 
Philadelphia must live within its means.  We can only spend the revenues that 
are given to us by the city and the state.  This is the harsh reality of how that 
looks18."  This harsh reality looks downright bad for schools across the City.  
West Philadelphia’s Bryant Elementary was forced to reduce the number of days 
it kept a school nurse on site to just two days a week.  On an off day, September 
25th, 2013, Laporcha Massey, a student, complained of breathing problems.  
                                                          
16
 Hurdle (2013) 
17
 Mezzacappa (2013) 
18
 Ibid. 
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She was sent home then taken to a local hospital by her parents where she later 
died from asthma complications19.  In the wake of the tragedy, just days later, 
then-Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett released $45 million in state aid for 
Philadelphia schools.  Although the governor had previously withheld the money 
in lieu of concessions from the teacher's union, the funds could now be used to 
hire back 400 teachers and staff20.    
 
Forty-five million dollars hardly makes up for the $1 billion dollars of state 
education financing that was slashed from the governor's 2011 budget - much of 
it a consequence of expiring federal stimulus funds21.   It was this budget that 
forced Philadelphia's School District into its current fiscal crisis, and since then, 
the State legislature has refused to invest more.  Despite the political division that 
exists between a predominately Republican state legislature and a predominately 
Democratic Philadelphia caucus, real inequities exist in the State’s school 
funding formula.  According to a recent article in the Washington Post, per-pupil 
spending in Pennsylvania’s poorest school districts, like Philadelphia, is 33% 
lower than spending in the State’s wealthiest districts – the highest differential in 
the U.S.22.  Although state education subsidies to Philadelphia likely spillover into 
positive economic gains for the entire state economy, it does not preclude the 
political reality that discourages a Republican officials from redistributing more 
rural and suburban tax dollars to Philadelphia students.  
                                                          
19
 Whites-Koditschek (2013) 
20
 Snyder et al. (2013) 
21
 Couloumbis (2013) 
22
 Brown (2015) 
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We often associate this sort of fiscal redistribution with equity, and although 
society agrees that education is worth subsidizing, there is clearly less 
agreement on who should pay for it.  Education was not always a public good.  
The original public school (re)formers had to convince Americans that the human 
capital benefits of public education outweighed the additional taxation.  By touting 
the positive effect of education on immigrant assimilation, poverty reduction, and 
labor force improvement, the debate focused not on whether taxes should be 
used to fund education but on how much23.     
 
The local property tax has been the traditional financing mechanism for schools, 
but in response to ailing urban economies and burgeoning funding inequality, a 
push was made in the 1970s toward a more centralized financing model.  In 
Philadelphia’s case, if the spigot of state aid for schools were to be permanently 
shut, local property taxes alone would not be sufficient for preventing additional 
school closings and the continued degradation of school quality.  Given these 
fiscal hardships and the City’s legal mandate to provide public education, what 
alternative models can a city like Philadelphia choose from if not traditional public 
schools? 
 
One option is charter schools.  According to the most current data from the 
National Center for Education Statistics there are 6,212 charter schools operating 
                                                          
23
 Katz (2013) 
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across 40 states nationwide (6% of all schools).24  There are 85 currently 
operating in Philadelphia serving 45% of the overall District enrollment25.  
Charters introduce choice into the education marketplace and households faced 
with the prospect of sending their children to a failed neighborhood school may 
choose a charter if it provides a higher quality alternative.  However, school 
choice does not exist in a vacuum.  Oftentimes, a choice for or against a school 
is a choice for or against an entire neighborhood and when an entire region 
chooses likewise, these dynamics are powerful enough to carve cities and 
regions in to segregated enclaves.   
 
This dissertation targets school and neighborhood choice as the primary 
mechanism that reinforces concentrated intergenerational urban poverty.  The 
research in this dissertation goes beyond asserting simply that increased school 
quality can help end this legacy.  It argues that planners can exploit 
neighborhood choice to “reprogram” the spatial orientation of neighborhoods, the 
tax revenues they generate and the school quality they produce.  There are two 
main research questions:  In order to establish just how important good schools 
are toward the economic vitality of neighborhoods and to justify a schools-centric 
intervention, the first question asks how much are Philadelphia home buyers 
willing to pay for quality schools both Citywide and in the case where a new high 
quality school was opened in a neighborhood that previously did not have one.  
The second questions asks, given the role of quality schools in neighborhood 
                                                          
24
 National Center for Education Statistics (2013) 
25
 Philadelphia School District (2015) 
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economic development, is it possible for planners to develop a new placed-based 
intervention that uses school quality as a means to equitably revitalize 
neighborhoods?  
 
This dissertation advocates that planners repurpose the Business Improvement 
District framework to fund local schools, but instead of bounding the District to 
include a homogenous area (like a downtown, for istance), this intervention 
suggests the demarcation of a mixed-income neighborhood.  It argues that these 
‘School Improvement Districts’ can foster both equitable neighborhood economic 
development and increased human capital development. 
 
The following chapter provides an in-depth literature review that explores the 
causes of urban and regional income segmentation and how planners can work 
towards breaking down this pattern.  Chapter 3 provides some background on 
one particular school quality intervention that is later used to address the first 
research question – the willingness to pay for high quality schools in 
Philadelphia.  Chapter 4 outlines the econometric research design used for 
research question one and then describes a set of policy-related questions asked 
of local experts whose experience is relevant to the School Improvement District 
framework.  Chapter 5 presents the results of the school quality econometric 
study.  Chapter 6 simulates the School Improvement District planning process 
and then discusses relevant planning issues informed by the expert interviews.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes.  Three appendices complete the study.  The first 
10 
 
describes an analysis that finds a positive relationship between the number of 
students scoring proficient or advanced on math and reading test scores and 
student racial diversity in Philadelphia elementary schools.  It is intended to help 
defend the idea that not only can School Improvement Districts effect 
neighborhood economic development, but that the income mixing they foster can 
also increase human capital returns, as well.  The second appendix is a two-
page policy brief that provides some background for interview respondents.  The 
third lists the questions asked of experts who were gracious enough to be 
interviewed for this project. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although it may sound like an unusual focal point for motivating a school-related 
intervention, this literature review is assembled around the following question, 
‘why is it that across any given region, income segregation is a major feature of 
the built environment and what lessons can this outcome teach us when planning 
productive and equitable neighborhood interventions?”  There are three 
interrelated streams of literature that help answer this question.  The first stream 
discusses what makes schools productive and argues that their low productivity 
in Philadelphia has led to a failed public school system and the rise of school 
choice.  It argues that these alternative, market-based models which incentivize 
across neighborhood mobility, decouple schools from their surrounding 
neighborhoods which can have dire repercussions for neighborhood economic 
development.  The second strand of literature links school choice to 
neighborhood choice, and argues that if left unchecked, neighborhood choice 
produces negative outcomes for those who cannot afford to be choosy.  The third 
stream puts neighborhood choice in the dynamic context of gentrification as a 
dynamic urban process and describes how government intervention in housing 
markets is required in order to balance growth and equity.  The final section of 
this review puts all of these pieces together to inform the particulars of a 
proposed School Improvement District program.  Bounding these four threads is 
a discussion of the current school financing crisis in Philadelphia. 
 
12 
 
 
The production of education in the U.S. 
 
Following a severe decline in education outcomes in the 1970s, researchers 
have been working to identify the drivers of school productivity.  Their goal has 
been to examine how school outcomes are influenced by different school-related 
expenditures26.  The literature that has emerged has a long and varied trajectory.  
Forming the basis for debate in this field is the finding that positive school 
outcomes are not so easily explained by traditional measures of school quality27.  
This conclusion is perhaps unsurprising given the number of relatively intangible 
variables behind the probability of one’s success in school.   
 
Stanford researcher Erik Hanushek is at the forefront of this debate and has 
authored several comprehensive reviews on the subject of ‘input-based 
schooling policies’28.  He notes that although real spending per pupil saw an 
annual average increase of 3.5% between 1890 and 1990, student performance, 
specifically in the sciences, was lower in 1999 than in 1970.  He suggests that, 
“Eager to improve quality and unable to do it directly, government policy typically 
moves to what is thought to be the next best thing – providing added resources 
to schools.”  This strategy, he claims, has proven “ineffective.”   
 
                                                          
26
 Pritchett & Filmer (1997) 
27
 Betts (1995).  Traditional measures of school quality include teacher salaries, teacher quality, student/teacher ratio, 
teacher experience, enrollment and others. 
28
 Among them includes Hanushek (1989; 2003; 2004) 
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The literature does conclude that there is no one recipe for achieving success.   
Additional expenditures can play a role, but what really matters is an 
understanding of which value-added approaches are effective and which need to 
be revamped29.  For example, given their limited resources, should a school 
district spend money on better teachers or smaller class sizes?  School vouchers 
or charter schools?  This understanding, researchers argue, must be driven by 
strong program evaluations based on testable hypotheses and experimental 
evidence30.  Examples of value-added program evaluations include early 
childhood education31; the impacts of quality teachers32; teacher bonuses33; and 
smaller class sizes34.   
 
The impetus for experimental approaches is that the level of resources given to a 
particular school district, school, classroom or individual student is at least 
partially a function of student outcomes35.  Many of the intangibles that contribute 
to student success are often difficult to separate from what the student might 
experience in the classroom.  For instance, the neighborhood in which a child 
grows up has a significant effect on educational attainment36.  As traditional 
public schools are placed-based, these “peer effects” can permeate into the 
classroom.  While the evidence on peer effects in general is mixed, studies have 
                                                          
29
 Hattie (2013); Hanushek (2003). 
30
 Ellis (2014) 
31
 See Reynolds et al. (2002) and Heckman (2006) for a thorough review.  Experimental evidences includes the Perry 
Preschool Program (Schweinhart et al., 2005) and the Abecodarian program (Campbell et al., 2002). 
32
 Braun (2005) & Rothstein (2009) for review; Chetty et al. (2010) and Chetty et. Al. (2013) for experimental evidence. 
33
 Eberts et al. (2002)  and Podgursky & Springer (2007) for reviews; Springer et al. (2011) for experimental evidence. 
34
 Achilles (2003) for a review.  Finn & Achilles (1999), Finn et al. (2005) and Chetty et al. (2010) for experimental 
evidence. 
35
 Houtenville & Conway (2008). 
36
 Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn (2000); Ravitch (2011). 
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found that peers do play a role in outcomes for several important social 
contexts37.  Research presented in Technical Appendix 1 of this dissertation finds 
that more student diversity at the school-level is associated with positive test 
score outcomes in Philadelphia elementary schools.  
 
In practice, peer effects mean that the performance of one student is correlated 
with the average of his peers38, and if this is the case, it can bias our empirical 
understanding about the role of different value-added interventions.  A study 
might find that good teachers increase their student’s test scores, but it is entirely 
possible that this result is driven by the socioeconomic makeup of different 
classrooms.  Researchers often attempt to hold both these neighborhood and 
classroom peer effects constant while identifying program efficacy.   
 
Charters and school choice  
 
Given the School District of Philadelphia’s current fiscal crisis, it is unlikely that 
new, value-added reforms could be introduced in classrooms. In fact, the 
opposite has been occurring.  Its mounting deficit has forced the school district to 
engage in a wide array of cuts that are effecting not only schools but the 
neighborhoods that surround those schools as well.   
                                                          
37
 See Sacerdote (2011) for a review.  Hoxby (2000) finds significantly positive peer effect associated with an increase in 
the number of females in a school cohort.  She also finds a significant intra-race peer effect.  Gaviria & Raphael (2001) 
report very large peer effects with respect to drug use, drinking, cigarettes and high school dropout.  Methodologically, the 
concern is that peer effects are highly non-linear.  That is, the spillover effect resulting from the presence of an additional 
student will vary depending on whether that student achieves in the 1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th quartile (Hoxby & Weingarth, 2005). 
38
 Angrist (2014). 
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In spring, 2013, school superintendent William Hite laid off 3,800 employees39.  
The following spring, he threatened that unless the District was awarded $100 
million from the State as a short-term fiscal band aid, he would lay-off an 
additional 810 teachers40.  These cuts would increase high school classroom size 
from 33 students to 41 students on average.   
 
Over the last three decades, a variety of alternative education models have been 
developed around the country.  In Philadelphia, the charter school model has 
emerged at the center of the City’s school reform agenda – a direct consequence 
of its current fiscal crisis.  Although the original purpose of charter schools was to 
provide a laboratory for educators to experiment with new value-added models,41 
in Philadelphia, the motivation is marked by fiscal necessity.  
 
Charters receive the same per-pupil funding as public schools but shift the 
responsibility of public education away from a centralized bureaucracy like a 
school district and into the hands of privately managed, independent operators.  
Unlike traditional public schools in Philadelphia which draw students from the 
surrounding neighborhood, many charters take students from across the city42. 
 
                                                          
39
 Mezzacappa (2013) 
40
 Mezzacappa (2013) 
41
 Center for Public Education (2010).   
42
 There is a small but growing number of charter schools in Philadelphia that are neighborhood based.  Although, these 
programs are only a few years old, the smaller class sizes and tutoring programs have shown promise (Gold et al. 2012; 
Westervelt, 2013).  
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The motivation for charters came out of the government entrepreneurism 
movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s43.  Advocates suggested that public 
institutions should be retrofitted with private-sector management strategies -- 
replacing bureaucracy with markets44.  Osborne & Gaebler’s, Reinventing 
Government (1993), touted these ideals suggesting that in order for government 
to provide a quality product, its "business model" should be informed by several 
key market-oriented approaches.  Chief among these is efficiency; the idea that if 
we are going to allocate tax dollars to increase social welfare, we should choose 
a mechanism from which the benefits outweigh the costs.  Second, the authors 
suggest that local community empowerment and local control is more efficient 
than centralized control; and that inducing firms, households and governments to 
make "better" choices requires that incentives be properly aligned. 
 
The often-cited rationale for introducing choice into education is that it breeds 
competition, and forces schools to be more effective and efficient or else risk 
losing students to more productive schools 45.  Since choice works in the 
business world, some argue, it should also work in education46.  The critical 
response to this justification is that market oriented solutions are not always best 
for addressing socioeconomic deficiencies rooted in centuries of inequality47.  
Although, it is likely that schools and their consumers will change their behavior 
given new, choice-generated market incentives, the question is, to what extent 
                                                          
43
 Osborne & Gaebler (1993) 
44
 Katz & Jones (2013) 
45
 Jenks (1970); Checci (2006) 
46
 Ravitch (2011) 
47
 Cucchiara (2013) 
17 
 
will this occur and will it result in Pareto efficient outcomes48?  This is an 
exceedingly difficult question to answer particularly if we consider that some 
families may not have all the pertinent information that might otherwise lead to a 
productive choice.  In this case, an extra degree of choice is not likely to lead to 
productive outcomes for their children. 
 
Theory aside, nearly two decades of charter evaluations paints at best, a mixed 
picture of outcomes.  Many evaluations compare charter outcomes to those of 
traditional public schools without consideration for the heterogeneous nature of 
charter curricula49.  In addition, as before, improperly accounting for the 
otherwise unobserved traits of students (such as neighborhood and other peer 
effects) can lead to biased evaluations50. 
 
One of the largest meta-analysis of charter school outcomes characterizes 
charter school evaluations by their empirical rigor51.  When only the strongest 
studies are included, the authors find no difference between charters and 
traditional public schools.  The authors found that of the 38 states that had 
charter laws on the books at the time of publication (2004), only 8 states had 
independent evaluations based upon defensible research designs. 
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Since that time, additional evaluations have studied charter outcomes by using a 
random assignment approach.  This strategy compares outcomes for students 
who won charter admission lotteries to outcomes for those who entered lotteries 
but lost.  This design helps deal with selection bias52.  Two such studies in New 
York City and Chicago have shown that students who won lotteries and attended 
charters performed modestly better than their peers who lost53.  In a comparable 
study from Boston, researchers found much more pronounced positive effects for 
students who won charter lotteries54.  These studies find that positive outcomes 
are associated with value-added measures including the number of years a 
charter has been operational; a longer school year; and smaller class size. 
 
Unlike Boston and New York, the catalyst to move to charters in Philadelphia 
was not to test innovative models but to address fiscal insolvency55.  These 
contextual differences suggest that outcomes from cities like Boston and New 
York may not be generalizable to Philadelphia.  Entrepreneurs looking to take 
advantage of new market opportunities by opening new schools may be putting 
additional pressure on the District to approve more charters.  In this case, it is 
important to point out the that research shows that new charter schools are less 
effective than more established ones56.  
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There is one precedent for Philadelphia’s current situation.  No other city took to 
charters as a solution to its crippled school district more than New Orleans which 
was carrying $250 million in debt before Hurricane Katrina made landfall57.  The 
storm destroyed more than 100 of its 120 schools and forced an estimated 
50,000 students to relocate to other schools around the country58.  From the 
rubble emerged charter schools which, as of 2010, comprised 61 of 88 public 
schools in New Orleans59.  In 2014, New Orleans became the nation’s first major 
urban school district to be comprised entirely of charter schools60. 
 
What do charters have to do with School Improvement Districts?  Inherent in 
school choice is the ability for charters to admit students from across the city.  If 
parents choose to pull a child from a neighborhood school and send the child 
across town to a charter, the parents are not only choosing against the 
neighborhood school but the surrounding neighborhood as well.  In fact, these 
choices can have detrimental effects on the broader school financing landscape, 
on social capital formation and on neighborhood economic development. 
 
Toward the financing issue, consider that each new charter deepens the 
Philadelphia School District’s already calamitous deficit.  Due to the publically 
funded/privately managed nature of charters, when a student leaves a traditional 
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neighborhood public school for a charter, the School District must transfer 
funding from its budget to that of the charter school.  A portion of these losses 
are fixed costs like the maintenance on buildings, teacher salaries and pensions 
which can only be offset by cutting costs.  This compounds an already dire fiscal 
situation, as increasing numbers of students who transfer to charters further 
causes the School District to close neighborhood schools and/or lay off teachers.  
Not only does this continued degradation widen the District’s fiscal hole but it 
also lowers demand for neighborhood schools as well61.   
 
Yet another benefit of neighborhood-anchored public schools is that they are part 
of a system that promotes and develops social capital62.  The ‘neighborhood unit’ 
concept first described in the late 1920s advocates for the school as the focal 
point of a neighborhood, making it the central gathering place for residents to 
meet, recreate and even organize63.  Evidence also suggests that urban 
neighborhood schools help promote positive health outcomes and limit a child's 
exposure to excessive traffic or crime64.  Not surprisingly, education researchers 
believe that healthy neighborhood schools are the cornerstone of healthy 
neighborhoods65. 
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Lastly, and most critical for this research is that a move to charters may inhibit 
local economic development generated by neighborhood schools.  While well-
managed charters may produce positive education outcomes, the induced 
across-neighborhood mobility might also erode the economic anchor relationship 
between a traditional public school and its surrounding neighborhood.  See 
Chapter 5 for an explanation of how good schools effect neighborhood housing 
markets.    
 
There is a large literature on the premium households are willing to pay for 
quality neighborhood schools66.  These premiums vary as new data and new 
statistical techniques emerge over time67.  Early research found little evidence 
that school quality was capitalized into neighborhood home prices68.  Research 
from the 1970s and 1980s found a positive capitalization effect for both school 
expenditures and test scores69.   More contemporary approaches estimate wide-
ranging price premiums associated with good schools70.  A one standard 
deviation increase in school quality can lead to a home price premium as varied 
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as one to ten percent71.  These results suggest that the price premium 
associated with “good schools” in one city is likely not generalizable to others72.  
A second issue with this literature is that it is cross-sectional which does not help 
us to understand what how the introduction of school quality where it previously 
did not exist might affect the neighborhood change process.  Finally, while much 
research relating home prices to public school outcomes exists, just one paper 
investigates the role of charters and finds very weak evidence of positive 
capitalization effects73.  This dissertation adds to this literature by estimating 
school quality-driven price premiums in a policy context driven by Philadelphia’s 
fiscally insolvent public school district.   
 
Aside from the need to balance land use goals and school enrollment projections 
in the comprehensive planning process, education policy is typically not within 
the professional purview of city planners.  Nevertheless, it is argued that school 
choice as a dynamic urban process can have serious ramifications on the 
economic and social wellbeing of neighborhoods.  The consequences of choice 
are further complicated by the fact that not only are city neighborhoods and 
neighborhood schools in competition with each other – they are in competition 
with places from across the region as well.  Thus, to understand fully, the 
economic impacts of school choice, we must understand how choice effects 
regional housing markets.  Through a nuanced appreciation of these dynamics, 
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planners can begin to craft more productive and equitable neighborhood-level 
interventions. 
 
Neighborhood Choice  
School financing decisions and school choice effect entire neighborhoods.  
Public schools and their surrounding neighborhoods are fundamentally linked to 
one another.  Intervention in one domain will have effects in the other.  To 
understand this process, one must understand that a neighborhood is not an 
autonomous entity but a peripheral that exists as part of a larger system of 
interconnected places in a region.  Choice for one place is a choice against 
another; and millions of choices over forty or fifty years can result in widespread 
spatial segmentation across an entire region.  Upper income families typically live 
together by choice.  While lower income families are similarly clustered, their 
choices are limited by economic realities that often relegate them to poorly 
served places.  While this outcome sounds bleak, it is only through an 
understanding of these dynamics that we can begin to think about how to 
harness the power of neighborhood choice to positively affect the situation. 
 
In his seminal paper, Tiebout focuses on the “consumer-voter” who chooses 
among a series of regional alternatives, one “which best satisfies his preference 
pattern for public goods74.”  As is the case in any market, “The greater the 
number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the 
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consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position75.”  Thus, the 
consumer will exercise his choice for a community that best suits his needs.  
 
There are costs associated with this choice, most notably the cost of public 
services and amenities76.  Households consider these conditions when deciding 
where to live and how much to pay for housing.  Locations that have poor 
amenities and unattractive fiscal conditions struggle to attract high income 
residents which is why downtrodden cities are often defined by struggling real 
estate markets.   
 
The property tax is the principal mechanism by which municipalities fund public 
services.  Communities are free to set property tax rates according to the level of 
services desired by residents.  This system works well if all residents are willing 
or able to pay an amount exactly equal to the value of the services they 
consume.  It quickly breaks down however, if value-seeking consumer-voters 
attempt to ‘free-ride’ by paying for less services than they consume77.  How does 
this work?  Consider the following stylized example:  Imagine a town comprised 
only of households with school-aged children who all attend the local school.  In 
this town, the zoning code requires that every house be built on 1 acre of land 
and each household pay $1,000 in taxes annually for the only public service in 
town -- the school.  In this situation everyone pays $1,000 in taxes and receives 
                                                          
75
 Pg. 418. 
76
 Other costs exist as well.  Rosen (1979); Roback (1982) write about the role of quality of life; Gyourko & Tracy (1991) 
write about the role of fiscal conditions; (Glaeser, 2007) for review. 
77
 Fischel (2006) 
25 
 
$1,000 in school quality.  Now imagine that the zoning code is altered to allow 
the 1 acre plots to be split in half such that each half acre lot now contains its 
own home with new students to attend the local school.  The homeowners on 
these plots are still receiving $1,000 worth of school quality, but they're only 
paying $500 for the privilege.  
 
Given enough half-plotters, the quality of schools may decline because the town 
is funding more students with less revenue.  This might be particularly upsetting 
for those households paying $1000 in taxes and it might incentivize them to pick 
up and choose another community where they are assured value in exchange for 
their taxes.  This loss of tax revenue would further degrade school quality in the 
town. 
 
To prevent free-riders, suburban municipalities often employ fiscal zoning – a 
standard that ensures each household consumes an amount of taxable land 
equal to cost of the services they consume78.  As such, any household that 
cannot afford to purchase so much land or pay so much in taxes is automatically 
excluded from locating in that suburb and consuming its services.  This may 
seem unfair, particularly in the realm of education, which is often thought of as a 
public good79.  Land use controls like fiscal zoning blur the line between public 
and private goods and make it possible for a community to exclude.  By providing 
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schools in a manner best suited to the needs of local residents public education 
becomes less of a quasi-public good and more of a “club good”80.  While fiscal 
zoning is advantageous to the economic health of a suburban community, it is 
exclusionary and clearly detrimental to low-income residents who might 
otherwise benefit from consuming higher quality schools81.   
 
Disinvested communities do not emerge randomly.  They are the consequence of 
a collective action; a preference for certain places by those who can afford to be 
choosy.  Choice, be it at the municipal or neighborhood level is the principal 
driver of economic segregation.  Some context for this assertion is provided 
below but for now consider that neighborhoods are more than just a physical 
manifestation of space and certainly more than just a commodity to be bought 
and sold.  Neighborhoods provide the social and economic context in which 
individuals interact and communicate with each other on an everyday basis.  
Roland Benabou observes: 
The accumulation of human capital underlies the evolution of both income 
inequality and productivity growth.  As demonstrated most vividly by the 
physical blight and social pathology of inner-city schools, certain essential 
inputs in this process are of a local nature.  They are determined neither at 
the level of individual families nor that of the whole economy, but at the 
intermediate level of communities, neighborhoods, firms, or social 
networks.  Not only is this the case with school resources when funding is 
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decentralized but also with many forms of “social capital”: peer effects, 
role models, job contracts, norms of social behavior, crime, and so on.  
Through these fiscal and sociological spillovers, the next generation’s 
distribution of skills and incomes is shaped by the manner in which the 
current one sorts itself in differentiated clusters82 (Emphasis added).  
 
These shared social experiences can have dire consequences on the economic, 
health and social wellbeing of residents who live in places of concentrated 
poverty83.  The ability for the middle-class to choose freely limits the development 
of effective human capital institutions in disadvantaged places, and also 
perpetuates a neighborhood context which inhibits the ability for students to learn 
and achieve upward mobility84.   
 
The Tieboutian choice process is one reason why many Philadelphia 
neighborhoods can no longer support a public school.  Between 1950 and 2010, 
Philadelphia lost nearly a quarter of its population.  Several mechanisms were at 
work including widespread manufacturing loss, and the globalization of 
employment85.  In addition, government sponsored mortgage programs favored 
greenfield development86, while construction of the federal highway system 
fostered decentralization87 which enabled city residents to relocate to suburban 
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locales88.  As the middle class left cities they took their housing capital with them.  
This major shift exasperated inner-city segregation89 creating a 'spatial mismatch' 
between an urbanized labor force and an increasingly suburban employment 
market90.  In addition, it perpetuated vacancy by limiting demand in the face of a 
fixed and durable housing supply91.  Many cities and neighborhoods were left 
with neither a sustainable demand for housing nor a sufficient tax-base to 
support local public services. 
 
Low-income families are attracted to cities like Philadelphia because of the 
presence of inexpensive housing, public transportation and other low-cost city 
services.  Income diversity in cities makes fiscal zoning as an exclusionary tool 
politically unfeasible.  As a result, free ridership is particularly endemic in many 
cities – to the point where we just refer to it diversity.  Cities are enormously 
redistributive92.  A hypothetical family of three living in Philadelphia and earning 
$75,000 annually pays 15.2% of its income in taxes93.  This suggests that for 
every dollar a middle-class family spends in taxes, they receive but a portion of 
that in the form services, with the balance being allocated to needy residents 
across the City.  This situation arises out of the political realities of urban 
governance and the responsibility of city governments to provide all residents 
with basic services.  It does so however, at the expense of households who can 
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afford to choose other locations in the region.  Those who remain, likely do so 
because they value the agglomeration benefits that only a city can provide.  Even 
in this case however, these residents exercise choice, albeit at the neighborhood 
level. 
 
Although large tax/service imbalances may exist at the city level, they may be 
less pronounced at the neighborhood scale.  Neighborhoods tend to exhibit a 
high degree of internal clustering with respect to race, income, home prices and 
other characteristics.  The same search parameters suburban households use to 
choose among many regional alternatives are used by urban households to 
choose among neighborhood alternatives.  As is the case in suburbs, high 
neighborhood home prices reflect higher quality services and amenities and 
higher income residents.  There is no fiscal zoning in cities but high housing 
costs serve as an equally powerful exclusionary mechanism.  Just as is the case 
at the regional level, the symbiotic relationship between quality services and 
affluent neighborhoods in cities gives rise to serious equity concerns for families 
and students who live in poor neighborhoods.  Notably, middle income families 
who value urban amenities but long for higher quality schools, have recently 
begun to raise funds for their local school.  For example, non-profit “Friends of” 
groups have begun popping up all over Philadelphia, soliciting donations from 
residents on behalf of their neighborhood schools94.  These groups are 
comprised largely of middle-class households, and although many members 
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have school-age children, the number of non-parent members are increasing95.  
These groups are discussed in more depth in Chapter 6.  The motivation for 
“Friends of” groups is fairly obvious - they are attempting to make up for the 
City’s inability to fund adequate school quality.  Their existence begs the 
question, why not have urban neighborhoods fund schools entirely on their own? 
 
Try to imagine if a situation did indeed arise where neighborhood residents were 
entirely responsible for financing their own schools.  Imagine if charters did not 
exist and the Philadelphia School District, forced to close under the weight of its 
mounting deficit, transformed these Friends of groups into neighborhood quasi-
governments that would collect and expend neighborhood taxes on the 
neighborhood school.  In this case, redistribution to other city schools would 
cease and school financing via property taxes would exclusively be a function of 
home prices.  Those who could afford a neighborhood with a quality school, 
would likely find value in such a system knowing that a greater proportion of their 
tax dollars are being spent in their own communities.  Those who can afford 
regional choice might even choose these neighborhoods over suburban 
townships.  
 
While economists often tout the efficiency that could be achieved by financing 
neighborhood services exclusively by way of neighborhood taxes, such a system 
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would have serious consequences for equity96.  This thought experiment does 
illustrate how the market, if left unchecked could respond to failing neighborhood 
schools.  It also demonstrates how neighborhood dynamics and laissez-faire 
approaches to city planning could lead to the commoditization of education97.  No 
longer would public schooling constitute even a quasi-public good as wholesale 
exclusion would become a reality. 
 
So the question becomes, can planners design a school quality intervention that 
harnesses choice, maintains equity and provides middle class households with 
value in exchange for their tax dollars?  More generally, might it possible to 
design an intervention that uses school quality to induce new neighborhood 
demand while preventing the displacement of existing residents?   
 
Affordable housing to mitigate the consequences of neighborhood choice  
 
Such a design begins with the understanding that free-riders, as they’re known in 
the suburban context, are an integral component of any urban anti-poverty 
initiative.  Providing the poor with high quality services that they could not 
otherwise afford is a key tenant of U.S. housing policy.  The stated goal of this 
policy is the provision of “a decent home in a suitable living environment for every 
American family98.”  The framers of this policy recognized the important 
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intersection of “housing production and related community development99.”  
Intergenerational urban poverty is often characterized by the social and 
economic isolation of low-income residents100, thus the theory of mixed-income 
neighborhoods holds that to improve the lives of the poor, we have to completely 
transform the context in which they live.  There are two potential mechanisms for 
achieving this transformation – the market-based approach which allows the 
invisible hand to reallocate capital across space as it sees it fit and the 
government-led approach which alters local housing supply and demand 
conditions through government intervention.  The market-approach raises 
serious concerns for equity – particularly the fear of residential displacement.  
Government funded affordable housing may be one way to prevent this fear from 
becoming a reality.   
 
The market induces neighborhood change either through changing preferences 
for urban living or new investment opportunities in the built environment101.  This 
“gentrification” process reduces income isolation de facto, by encouraging in-
sorting of higher income residents into a neighborhood.  Given the link between 
high incomes and home prices, the concern is that gentrification will increase 
housing burdens for low-income residents – perhaps leading to their 
displacement from the neighborhood.  Some have likened the process of 
                                                          
99
 Ibid. 
100
 Wilson (1987); Jenks & Mayer (1990). 
101
 Ley (1980, 1981); Hamnett (1996); Smith (1979, 1987)  
33 
 
gentrification to one that transforms cities from 'islands of renewal in seas of 
decay' to 'islands of decay in seas of renewal'102. 
 
The literature on gentrification-induced displacement is robust – and its 
conclusions may surprise.  Identifying displacement is difficult simply because 
there is no way to discern, in an absolute sense, gentrified neighborhoods from 
non-gentrified neighborhoods.  Yet for those who have tried, the results show 
that mobility rates from gentrified neighborhoods are comparatively less 
pronounced for less-educated, low-income households103.  In the face of 
increased housing costs, one important conclusion is that low-income residents 
in gentrified neighborhoods value the presence of new, positive local amenities 
like shops and restaurants – and likely school quality104.  There may be some 
interesting counterfactual explanations for the lack of displacement evidence.  
One, displacement tipping points may exist but are, at the margins, 
imperceptible, at least statistically105.  In other words, while it may be difficult to 
conclude generally that gentrification leads to displacement, there may be 
individual cases where it clearly does.   
 
Thus, some measure of government intervention is required in order to ensure 
equity and limit displacement in face of new residential demand.  Government at 
all levels has a history of intervening on both ends of the supply and demand 
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spectrum – and it is worth visiting this history, if only to get a sense of which 
strategies might help maintain equity within a School Improvement District 
framework.   
 
The programs informed by U.S. housing policy exist at intersection of housing 
and community development, but the latter has largely taken a back seat to the 
former. This is because housing programs, in an effort to maximize the number 
of developed affordable housing units, have historically allocated subsidy to the 
cheapest land available106.   The cheapest land tends to be that which is devoid 
of good quality services and amenities107.  This supply-side strategy has serious 
ramifications - a "spatial bias" that has traditionally allocated housing subsidy to 
low-income neighborhoods with poor quality public services and deficient living 
environments108.  Nevertheless, more than 5 million low-income housing units 
have been developed throughout the US109.  By any measure, it would be difficult 
to conclude that these strategies have succeeded in ending poverty in U.S. cities. 
  
The Housing Act of 1937 allowed local public housing authorities to construct and 
maintain housing for low income households and provided a mechanism for slum 
clearance – something that would become a mainstay of the housing reformers 
agenda for decades to come110.  These developments epitomized top-down, 
centralized city planning.  In many cities, local housing authorities replaced 
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dilapidated slums with high-rise public housing projects that would later become 
the face of devastation in primarily African American neighborhoods111.  These 
“monstrous high-rise edifices isolated low-income occupants by race and social 
class and obviated any notion of community112.” 
 
The federal government, still focused on supply-side solutions but reeling from 
the disastrous experiment that was public housing, turned to a new program in 
the 1990s that sought to replace distressed public housing with mixed-income 
housing.  Dubbed ‘HOPE VI’, the development of new public housing units 
actually served to displace a large number of tenants into neighborhoods of 
lesser or equal quality than that of the original housing projects113.   
 
Another contemporary supply-side housing development program is the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program, which is a federally mandated, 
state administered program that allows non-profits and developers to apply for 
tax credits which can be used to offset the costs of affordable rental housing 
development.  Credits are awarded for projects located in Qualified Census 
Tracts (QCT) - those where 50% of households have incomes 60% of the area 
median income (AMI).  The QCT requirements allocate government subsidy into 
neighborhoods with poor quality services.  Although at first glance, this rule might 
seem detrimental to fostering community development, it might be a valuable tool 
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if it were allocated in a low-valued neighborhood that we knew was going to 
experience gentrification in the coming years.  I return to this point again below. 
 
The federal government has also experimented with demand-side strategies as 
well.  The basic motivation behind these programs is to use government subsidy 
to allow the urban poor to choose better neighborhoods than they could 
otherwise afford on their own.  Scholars have largely supported the housing 
voucher program also known as Section 8, which gives rental vouchers to low-
income households under the assumption that they will redeem them in a 
neighborhood with comparatively higher quality public services114.  Unfortunately, 
evidence suggests that many participants ultimately do not choose better 
neighborhoods115.  Undeterred by these results, policy makers amended the 
voucher program in the 1990s to allow for inter-city renter mobility.  They sought 
further evidence of mixed-income neighborhood efficacy by engaging in an 
experiment, Moving to Opportunity (MTO), modeled on Chicago’s Gatreaux 
program.  This program randomly allocated low-income families into three 
groups116.  The first was the experimental group which received vouchers to be 
used explicitly in low-poverty neighborhoods; the second was the Section 8 
group which received traditional rental vouchers; and a third group (the control 
group), received no assistance and typically remained in some form of project-
based assistance.  Recent evidence suggests that in fact, transplanting a child 
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from a high poverty neighborhood to a low poverty one can have dramatic effects 
on the future earnings of that child117.  While better school quality is partially at 
work here, an evaluation of education outcomes for pre-school aged 
experimental participants were not significantly different than their control group 
peers118. 
 
To summarize, the goal of U.S. housing policy has been to provide both housing 
and community development, yet by all but the most recent measures, the 
programs motivated by this policy have not helped our city’s most vulnerable 
citizens break away from the yoke of poverty.  One idea that often goes 
overlooked however, is that randomly allocating individuals to high quality 
neighborhoods is fundamentally different than allocating high quality, 
neighborhood-sized interventions to low-income individuals119.  This might sound 
a bit paradoxical, but consider that if individual outcomes are so dependent on 
the context in which they were born and grew up, simply transplanting that 
individual to a new neighborhood context may not be enough.  In other words, we 
might observe an entirely different outcome if instead of assigning the urban poor 
to a suburban context (including better schools) within which they may feel 
alienated, we allocated aspects of the suburban context to the places where the 
urban poor live and are familiar with. 
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This idea, although not explicitly stated, is the motivation behind a new series of 
placed-based interventions laid out by the Obama administration.  The 
Department of Housing & Urban Development's Choice Neighborhoods Program 
is based on the realization that successful housing policy is more than just 
maintaining affordability or replacing/upgrading slums.  The Choice 
Neighborhoods program is more holistic, creating "the conditions necessary for 
public and private reinvestment in distressed neighborhoods to offer the kinds of 
amenities and assets, including safety, good schools, and commercial activity, 
that are important to families' choices about communities120."  Alongside new 
housing investment, examples of neighborhood improvement include new retail 
and transit development; parks urban farms and streetscape programs; 
performing arts; healthcare clinics and school improvement121. 
 
In addition, the federal government has realized that school improvement alone 
is important enough to warrant its own placed-based program - Promise 
Neighborhoods122.  Administered by the Department of Education, its vision is to 
give students access to "great schools" and "cradle-to-career" solutions toward 
"transforming communities123."  Promise Neighborhoods is modeled after the 
New York City’s Harlem Children’s Zone (HCZ).  The HCZ is a comprehensive 
urban neighborhood and education intervention that combines education 
programming from early childhood through high school with after-school, college 
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prep, community health programs, family counseling and more124.  Researchers 
have found that HCZ students perform better than their peers who applied for the 
HCZ school lottery but lost125.  They conclude, “High quality schools or 
community investments coupled with high-quality schools drive these results, but 
community investment alone cannot126.”  As of yet, there has been no research 
on the HCZ and outcomes related to neighborhood economic development.  
 
Given the political polarization that is now commonplace in federal politics, it is 
unlikely that these sorts of initiatives could be funded at a national scale.  
Further, these programs are not cheap.  The budget for one Choice or Promise 
Neighborhood implementation grant ranges from $20 to $30 million.  The Harlem 
Children’s Zone’s budget is roughly $50 million per year127.  In addition, there 
may be unintended consequences of these placed-based programs particularly if 
the goal is to “create the conditions necessary for public and private 
reinvestment.”  New services and amenities will be capitalized into neighborhood 
land prices enriching land owners but likely hurting renters and other low-income 
residents who might otherwise benefit from the new services128.  If left 
unchecked, the unintended consequences of these modern placed-based 
government programs may be residential displacement. 
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In summary, transplanting suburban-like contexts into downtrodden urban 
neighborhoods, particularly high quality education, may be one way to foster 
mixed-income neighborhoods and perhaps help lift residents out of poverty.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, higher-income households will likely exercise their 
choice for places with higher quality services like schools which, in the 
gentrification context, will require government-lead affordable housing to prevent 
residential displacement.  Given these realities and the potency of neighborhood 
choice to segment people across space, the next and final section introduces a 
policy prescription that uses the power of school and neighborhood choice to 
finance new school quality and balance growth with equity. 
 
A unifying policy prescription 
 
If changing preferences for urban living is the new norm, then cities like 
Philadelphia will almost certainly continue to gentrify.  In the face of this reality, 
planning should strive to find ways to leverage the gentry’s investment toward 
generating spillovers that can lead to more equitable outcomes.  To achieve this 
requires two related strategies.  The first is to harness the power of neighborhood 
choice to physically redefine the geographic extent of neighborhoods, the 
services they produce and the mix of individuals who consume them.  The 
second is to realign property taxation and expenditures by ensuring that a greater 
percentage of neighborhood taxes go to fund a greater share of neighborhood 
services – in this case schools.   
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We’ve already discovered that it is neither politically feasible nor equitable to 
finance neighborhoods services exclusively with neighborhood taxes.  In spite of 
this fact, municipalities, in response to perceived gaps between public service 
provision and demand for quality public services, have at times, turned to Special 
Service Districts (SSD)129.  SSDs are placed-based interventions defined by the 
Census as "separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal 
independence from general purpose local governments130.”  Examples of 
services might include watershed and flood control services, utility provision, and 
transportation131.    Although many SSD's fund projects by levying additional 
property taxes, some are financed by user fees132. 
 
An alternative flavor of SSDs is the Improvement District.  Although the legal 
framework for Improvement District adoption varies from state to state, they are 
generally formed through a local balloting process where approval requires 
majority consent from residents for whom additional property taxes would be 
assessed.  The incremental increase in tax revenues are then used to fund 
additional public services.  The most ubiquitous form of the Improvement District 
is the Business Improvement District (BID).  These are typically located in 
commercial areas and fund public safety, sanitation, streetscapes, business 
marketing and more – all at levels above what municipal governments already 
                                                          
129
 Brooks (2006) 
130
 U.S. Department of Commerce (2005) 
131
 Griffith (2007) 
132
 Carlton (2007). 
42 
 
fund133.  Two studies have separately identified 404 and 701 BIDs nationwide 
respectively134.   
    
Commercial districts are not the only places where Improvement Districts have 
been proposed.  Ellickson (1998) suggests "Block Improvement Districts", 
because they are comprised of "coterminous informal social networks" that are 
"scaled to produce the most localized varieties of public goods".  He suggests 
that the "block is far too small a unit for provision of a public good that involves 
either scale efficiencies or widespread benefits—a service such as elementary 
education, a sewer system, or police detective work." 
 
At a higher spatial scale, Pennsylvania has authorized 'Neighborhood 
Improvement Districts (NID)135.  The State Legislature cites as its rationale that, " 
The General Fund revenue derived from taxes many times is not sufficient to 
provide adequate municipal services or additional services needed in specific 
geographic areas within the municipality136."  The act suggests "municipalities 
should be encouraged to create, where feasible and desired, assessment-based 
neighborhood improvement districts which would include, but not be limited to, 
downtown commercial districts." "Designated district management associations 
would initiate and administer programs to promote and enhance more attractive 
and safer commercial, industrial, residential and mixed-use neighborhoods; 
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economic growth; increased employment opportunities; and improved 
commercial, industrial, business districts and business climates."   
 
A Pennsylvania NID requires the consent of at least 60% of District property 
owners and allows for the "acquisition, development, construction, improvement, 
rehabilitation, operation and/or maintenance of any building," including the use of 
eminent domain.  In addition, Pennsylvania NID's have the power to issue bonds.  
The 60% consent threshold ensures that Improvement Districts are democratic – 
if households are not interested in new services, they do not have to vote for the 
District.  This suggests that the probability of a District winning the consent of the 
voting majority is dependent on how the District is drawn.  A NID to fund elderly 
services in a neighborhood comprised of twenty-somethings is likely to fail.  By 
contrast, a NID to fund schools in an area predominately comprised of families 
with school-aged children might succeed. 
 
Special Service and Improvement Districts don’t just rely on choice to segment 
people across space – they plan segmentation explicitly.  Researchers have 
found a very direct association between Improvement Districts and real estate 
prices137, which is not surprising given the willingness of businesses and 
households to pay for high quality services.  Chapter of 5 of this dissertation finds 
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that households are willing to pay a premium for high quality schools.  In 
combination, this evidence suggests that an Improvement District for schools 
would successfully foster new neighborhood economic development.  What 
about equity, however?   
 
The key difference between say, a Business Improvement District which typically 
encompasses a homogenous area of the city (i.e. a downtown) and a School 
Improvement District, is that the boundaries of the latter would be drawn to 
encompass a mixed-income neighborhood.  This allows local political leaders to 
manipulate the de facto spatial segmentation that results from neighborhood 
choice.  It also allows gives them the ability to alter the supply of and demand for 
public services which could potentially lead to a more equitable income 
distribution. 
 
Indeed, Improvement Districts mean tax increases, and although the new tax rate 
is flat, the tax is made more progressive by the fact that the tax liability is a 
function of home price138.  Thus, the tax liability of lower valued homes is less 
than that on higher valued homes.  Although all in-District residents receive an 
equal share of the new school quality, the costs are more equitably distributed.   
 
This framework also helps to ensure a large quantity of affordable housing - at 
least initially.  There is a distinction here worth noting.  By nature, low priced 
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housing is affordable, but if the new services increase the willingness to pay for 
in-District housing, we should expect the price of housing to increase as 
neighborhood amenities improve.  It is for this reason that local political leaders 
can bundle a School Improvement District with the development of government 
subsidized affordable housing.  Of all the programs discussed above, the Low-
Income Housing Tax Credit is best suited for this purpose.  The Qualified Census 
Tract requirements of the LIHTC program require that the subsidy is allocated to 
the lower-valued section of a School Improvement District.  This would insert 
affordable housing today into a neighborhood that could improve in the years to 
come.  Thus, bundling LIHTC and School Improvement Districts could be a 
proactive way to ensure that low-income residents, particularly renters, can 
access school improvements even if they cannot afford market prices.  There are 
additional decision factors related to the potential location of School Improvement 
Districts that will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
This literature review asked why it is that segmentation and segregation is such a 
lasting feature of the urban and regional landscape.  Highlighting Philadelphia’s 
school reform agenda, including a move to charter schools, helps underscore 
how choice can have direct consequences on the economy of neighborhoods.  
This relationship is explained by the broader dynamics of neighborhood choice 
which, if left unchecked, can relegate the poor to disadvantaged neighborhoods 
with low quality public services.  While the processes of gentrification and 
displacement may shuffle the segmentation tapestry, housing subsidies are 
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needed to prevent further isolation of the urban poor.  It is then argued that the 
power of choice can be harnessed to rewire neighborhoods such that public 
service spillovers generated by the wealthy can be leveraged to help the poor.  
One solution, it is argued, are Improvement Districts for funding increased school 
quality.  The innovation that may potentially overcome income segmentation is to 
bound the District to include an income diverse neighborhood in order to drive 
both growth and equity. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA & THE PENN 
ALEXANDER SCHOOL 
 
Anchor institutions like universities and health care providers (the so-called “Eds. 
& Meds”) have, over the last fifteen years, become major players in the urban 
economic development realm139.  These organizations are often large employers; 
procure massive quantities of goods and services from across their regions; own 
large swatches of valuable city land and are the major drivers of human capital 
development in their respective cities.   
 
In places like Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York, the economic strength of 
anchor institutions allowed them to weather the urban decline that chased many 
residents and businesses out of cities.  In these and other places, anchor 
institutions have carried the torch of urban revitalization by capitalizing on the 
symbiotic relationship between themselves and their surrounding 
neighborhoods140.   
 
The University of Pennsylvania has a long history of planned interventions in 
West Philadelphia.  In the era of Urban Renewal, Penn leveraged Section 112, 
2:1 matching federal grants for real estate acquisition, development and 
redevelopment141.  Penn’s development activities throughout this time were 
                                                          
139
 Adams (2003) 
140
 Ehlenz & Birch (2014) 
141
 Cohen (1998) provides a thorough review of Penn’s redevelopment activities at this time. 
48 
 
largely improvements to the physical plant, but later, in 1996 when a graduate 
student was murdered just off campus, the University had an 'all options on the 
table' approach to redevelopment.  They could relocate the entire campus to the 
suburbs; physically wall itself off from the City or invest its own capital into the 
surrounding neighborhood. 
 
Penn chose the latter, announcing the West Philadelphia Initiatives program in 
1996.  The stated goal of the program was to stimulate neighborhood investment 
by focusing on four major components of neighborhood revitalization: Housing, 
safety, economic development and schooling142.  In partnership with the area’s 
other major academic institutions, the University created the not-for-profit 
University City District (UCD), whose primary mission continues to be 
“community revitalization”, working “within a place-based, data-driven framework 
to invest in world-class public spaces, address crime and public safety, bring life 
to commercial corridors, connect low-income residents to careers, and promote 
job growth and innovation143.”  The University also engaged in a widespread real 
estate investment program by purchasing and improving both single family and 
rental properties and making significant mortgage guarantees to University-
affiliated borrowers144.   
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In 2001, Penn helped finance the construction of the Penn Alexander School 
(PAS), a public elementary school, providing the land, $24 million worth of capital 
expenditure and an ongoing annual student subsidy of roughly $700,000.  The 
University also raised additional funding from the William Penn Foundation, 
major benefactors and former University president Judith Rodin to fund an 
endowment.  In partnership with the School District of Philadelphia, the school 
opened in two phases, 2001 and 2004.  Any student living with the school 
catchment boundary (Figure 3.1) is granted admission and in turn the University 
provides a $1,330 per pupil subsidy145.   
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Figure 3.1: The Penn Alexander School catchment 
 
The school has proven so successful that a January 2012 article from the 
Philadelphia Inquirer reported that more than 70 people camped out in line in the 
cold for 2 days hoping to register their child for kindergarten. Said one parent, 
“The school was the only reason we bought our house"146.  In 2013, the 
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University changed its admissions rules.  No longer does living in the catchment 
guarantee a seat in a class – now a lottery process dictates admission147. 
 
According to the Pennsylvania Department of Education, compared to the 
Philadelphia school district as a whole, Penn Alexander ranks in the 90th 
percentile for attendance.  92% of 5th graders are proficient or better in state 
math tests relative to 56% in the district and 76% in the state.  84% of 5th graders 
are proficient or better in state reading tests relative to 46% in the district and 
67% in the state.  Simply put, students at PAS are out performing their peers in 
other schools throughout the district and the state and by 2014, test scores had 
the school ranked as the top Kindergarten through eighth grade school in 
Philadelphia148.  
 
The success of the Penn Alexander School makes it an ideal case for testing 
how much home buyers are willing to pay for new school quality where it 
previously did not exist.  Chapter 5 presents these estimates, concluding that 
school-quality driven home price premiums are substantial and that good schools 
can drive neighborhood economic development.  Indeed Penn’s stated goal for 
its school intervention was ‘neighborhood revitalization’, and although they were 
successful in stimulating the local economy, they also created a new middle-
class choice opportunity in the region.  A cursory comparison of Census counts 
between 2000 and 2010 for the ten block groups with centroids inside the 
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catchment show that although the total population increased 14%, the number of 
African Americans declined 43% and the number of Whites increased 48%.  With 
this sea change in the demographic character of the neighborhood, it should 
come as no surprise that many local residents became concerned with Penn’s 
ability to induce change and alter the socioeconomic fabric of the 
neighborhood149. 
 
From a policy perspective, it is helpful to ask if the Penn Alexander treatment 
was Pareto optimal - that is, were all residents made better off and none made 
worse off?  Clearly, homeowners who were able to sell their homes at a price 
which capitalized the school price premium were made better off.  Renters, who 
saw rent increases however, may have been displaced as a result of the 
intervention.  Thus, while the University succeeded in creating a neighborhood of 
choice, they may have failed to ensure equity. 
  
This conclusion should not come as a surprise however.  Not all cities have an 
Ivy League university or equivalent private entities with the incentive to invest 
millions of dollars into local neighborhoods the way Penn has.  Even if they did, 
as this case illustrates, investors typically have few incentives to plan for equity.  
City elected officials do have this incentive however, and what’s more, they have 
a political mandate to provide it as well.  The Penn Alexander story should suffice 
in convincing elected officials that school quality can help drive neighborhood 
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investment.  What is needed is both a public financing mechanism and means to 
generate equity - precisely what School Improvement Districts are designed to 
do. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design 
 
 
This dissertation poses two questions.  First, what is the willingness to pay for 
good schools in Philadelphia and second, is the School Improvement District 
framework economically and politically feasible?  If so, what candidate locations 
in Philadelphia may be best suited for such interventions?  To address these 
questions, I engage in four separate but related analyses.  The first two address 
the first research question, the results of which appear in Chapter 5.  The latter 
two questions are used to inform a broader analysis and discussion of the School 
Improvement District planning process.  These results appear in Chapter 6. 
 
Analysis 1 uses a quasi-experimental research design to estimate the willingness 
of Philadelphia home buyers to pay for good schools.  This analysis pools five 
years’ worth of test score and home price data to test the hypothesis that test 
scores are capitalized into Philadelphia home prices.  However, given that these 
estimations are for one point in time, they do not provide useful insights as to 
what would happen if a new high quality school were to be introduced where one 
previously did not exist, or how neighborhood demand might increase over time 
in response.  To provide more realistic estimates along these lines, Analysis 2 
adopts a similar research design to evaluate the price premiums associated with 
the introduction of a new, high quality school – Penn Alexander.  These 
estimated price premiums allow an estimate of the property tax increase that 
could potentially result from a School Improvement District.  The results of 
analysis 1 & 2 appear in Chapter 5. 
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Analysis 3 uses this information alongside a spatial analytical site-suitability 
model to engage in a hypothetical School Improvement District planning process 
in Philadelphia.  A cartographic model is developed within a Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) framework.  This model allows an exploration of areas 
in Philadelphia where School Improvement Districts may be feasible on an 
economic, demographic and political basis.  The results of analysis 3 appears in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Finally, Analysis 4 augments the analytical results with interviews from key 
Philadelphia stakeholders whose experience is directly related to the planning, 
operation and financing of School Improvement Districts. 
 
 
Analysis 1:  Estimating the willingness to pay for good schools in 
Philadelphia  
 
The purpose of the statistical models described below is to provide an estimate 
that can be interpreted as the ‘average increase in home prices associated with a 
specified increase in test scores’.  Another way to think about this estimation is 
that it represents the willingness to pay, on behalf of your average Philadelphia 
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home buyer for an increase in public school quality150.  As discussed in Chapter 
3, researchers have for many years, sought ways to estimate the willingness to 
pay for a variety of neighborhood amenities and services.  Examples include 
includes parks, crime, transit and of course, schools151.   
 
The basic strategy for identifying this willingness to pay is to estimate a statistical 
model that decomposes the sale price of a home into the value of its physical 
attributes (number of bedrooms, bathrooms, etc.) together with the value of 
neighborhood attributes, including local school quality152.  An example of this kind 
of model is given in Equation 4.1: 
 
(4.1) icicicicic testScoreNXprice εββββ ++++= 3210 '')log(  
 
where the log price of a home sale i in school catchment c is hypothesized to be 
a linear function of relevant internal house characteristics (such as the number of 
bedrooms and bathrooms, 1( ,.., )i i kiX x x= ; together with a vector of neighborhood 
amenities, 1( ,.., )i i imN n n= , (such as distance to crime, parks or transit); and most 
importantly, ctestScore , reflecting the test score quality in catchment c.  All other 
influences on the log of price are conveyed in a residual error term, icε . 
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One shortcoming of Equation 4.1 is that there is no way to measure the extent to 
which differences among home prices are influenced by differences in school 
outcomes independent of either housing attributes or other neighborhood 
amenities.  The assumption is that 3β  reflects only the test score effect on home 
price with all else being held constant.  In reality, good schools are likely 
correlated with low crime rates or low instances of housing vacancy which would 
bias the school price premium estimate.   
 
It was first realized by Black (1999) that this limitation can be overcome by 
exploiting the exogeneity of school catchment boundaries with respect to test 
score outcomes.  In particular, while the economic fortunes of neighborhoods 
may change over time, school catchment boundaries largely remain fixed in 
place153.    
 
To explain this innovation, consider the following example.  In Philadelphia, the 
school catchment area a student lives in determines which public school she 
attends.  Figure 4.1 illustrates these catchment areas citywide.  Suppose that two 
homes across the street from one another are separated by a school catchment 
boundary.  Considering their immediate adjacency, it can be assumed that these 
houses are part of the same neighborhood. So by controlling only for differences 
in the internal characteristics of each home, all other price differences between 
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them can be attributed to catchment area differences (ie. school quality).  In 
Sandra Black’s words, “the fact that test scores make a discrete jump at 
attendance district boundaries while neighborhoods continue to change in a 
smooth manner allows me to isolate the relationship between test scores and 
house prices.”  
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Figure 4.1:  Elementary school catchment areas 
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This empirical technique is known as a “boundary discontinuity” design, and is a 
close cousin of the more well-known “regression discontinuity” design154.  The 
basic idea is to compare outcomes on either immediate side of a threshold at 
which a particular intervention is assigned.  The design is quasi-experimental in 
nature because it assumes that a household catchment decision is independent 
of everything but school quality155   
 
Thus, within the context of the statistical model, we no longer have to control for 
the infinite number of possible neighborhood-related drivers of price.  Instead, we 
form two groups of home sales – those in immediate proximity to one side of the 
boundary and another in immediate proximity to opposite side.  The basic idea 
then, is to relate across-boundary differences in home prices with across-
boundary differences in test scores controlling for the internal characteristics of 
homes.   
 
(4.2) icicicicicic testScoreBoundYearsXprice εββββββ +++++= 432210 ''')log(  
 
In 4.2 the vector of neighborhood controls is replaced by a vector of school 
catchment boundary fixed effects, [.., ( ),..]ic jBound b ic= 156.  In addition, a vector of 
year fixed effects, [.., ( ),..]ic jYear y ic= 157, allows five years of test score and home 
                                                          
154
 Thistlethwaite & Campbell (1960); Hahn et al. (2001); Lee & Lemieux (2010) 
155
 The “as good as random” assumption may be violated here if the sorting preferences of individuals are non-random – 
that is, if Blacks and Whites, for instance, place a heterogeneous premium on “good schools”.  See Bayer et al. (2010). 
156
 Here ( ) 1jb ic =  if house ic is closest to boundary jb  and is zero otherwise 
157
 Here ( ) 1jy ic =  if house sale,  ic , occurs in year jy .and is zero otherwise. 
61 
 
price data to be pooled.  Increasing the sample size by including multiple years of 
data is an important feature of the model.   
 
Here it is critical to note the importance of how far each home sale observation is 
from a given catchment boundary.  The goal is to compare home price and test 
score differences for homes on either immediate side of the catchment thus 
ensuring a robust substitutability of homes used in the sample.  Thus Equation 
4.2 can be estimated at different distance bandwidths around each boundary in 
order to assess how decreasing substitutability might bias the results.  The large 
sample size allows estimations using five bandwidths at 250ft intervals between 
500ft and 1500ft from the boundary158.  Figure 4.2 illustrates these distances. 
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Figure 4.2:  Distances from catchment boundaries 
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The model hypothesizes that school quality, as measured by test scores, is a 
significant causal driver of home prices in Philadelphia159.  If the testScore 
coefficient in Equation 4.2 is significantly positive, then this hypothesis is upheld.  
Of course, this hypothesis can only be tested if there are enough adjacent 
catchment areas with substantially different test scores.  If test scores were 
largely homogenous citywide, then the boundary approach would be insufficient 
for detecting sharp home price discontinuities at the boundaries. 
 
There are some revealing statistics to suggest that schools citywide are of 
homogenously low quality.  Figure 4.3 maps 3rd grade reading test scores for 
each catchment citywide in 2012.  According to the most current data from the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education, Philadelphia 3rd graders rank 10th out 
499 school districts statewide in the percent of students scoring proficient on 
state tests.  An ever worse statistic reflecting Philadelphia school quality is that 
only four Philadelphia schools, Penn Alexander among them, rank among the top 
300 in the percent of 3rd grade test takers scoring advanced on reading tests160.    
 
Chapter 5 to investigates the spatial differences in prices when for instance, poor 
schools border each other; good schools border poor ones, etc.  However, given 
that Philadelphia test scores are so low and that so many low score catchments 
are adjacent to one another, it is likely that the TestScore coefficient will be 
underestimated.  This weakness provides motivation for the analysis described 
                                                          
 
160
 There are roughly 1500 elementary schools statewide. 
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below which estimates school drive price premiums by exploiting a “shock” to the 
neighborhood economy – the introduction of a high quality school, Penn 
Alexander, where one previously did not exist.  
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Figure 4.3:  Mean test scores by school catchment: ‘No Data’ refers to non-traditional 
public school catchments including neighborhood charters. 
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Analysis 2:  Home price premiums associated with the Penn Alexander 
School 
 
Chapter 3 describes how the Penn Alexander Schools is a clear oasis among 
Philadelphia’s vast school quality desert.  Not only is it a choice school in the city 
but it’s a school of regional and state choice as well.  As such, the primary 
hypothesis of Analysis 2 is that the introduction of this school was, as the 
University intended, a catalyst for neighborhood revitalization, and led to an 
increase in neighborhood home prices.  The secondary hypothesis is that this 
home price premium increased over time as more and more home buyers sorted 
into the neighborhood to access the new school amenity. 
 
The research design for Analysis 2 is similar in theory to that of Analysis 1.  
Instead of using test scores as an indicator of school quality however, based on 
metrics provided in Chapter 3, I assume ex ante that Penn Alexander is a “good 
school”, and simply seek to estimate the price premium associated with this 
assumption.  To give some relative weight to the Penn Alexander price premium, 
a group of comparison or control sales are needed.  Ideally, these control sales 
should be identical to those in the Penn Alexander catchment accept for the fact 
that they did not receive the school “treatment”.  As was the case in Analysis 1, 
the most influential confounding factors here are non-school neighborhood 
effects and to control for these, as before, the design assumes that houses on 
either side of the catchment boundary are part of the same neighborhood.  Thus 
67 
 
after controlling for the internal characteristics of homes, the Penn Alexander 
price premium is simply the average difference between homes immediately 
adjacent to the boundary and in the catchment (the treatment group) and those 
just on the other side of the boundary but not in the catchment (the control 
group).  In order to ensure a robust enough sample size, home sales with 1000ft 
(roughly 2 blocks) from the catchment are included. 
 
Because Analysis 1 pools five years of test score and price data into one model, 
it provides just one price premium estimate – an average across all five years.  
The model assumes that although prices may change due to exogenous effects 
(like macro changes in the Citywide housing market), the price premium for high 
quality schools can be treated as stationary over time.  In this case, the Penn 
Alexander case however, we consider a nonstationary model in which a new, 
high-quality school opens and information about new educational opportunity 
slowly resonates throughout the region.  This environment allows for the more 
realistic possibility that housing demand in the neighborhood increases over time.  
To capture these effects, Analysis 2 includes eleven years of home price data 
beginning the year before the school opened.  In particular, the model estimates 
home price trajectories for control and treatment groups over this time period.  
The hypotheses is that prices increase faster within the Penn Alexander 
treatment group, and thus the price premium increases over time as well.   
 
Equation 4.3 provides the formal model.  
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(4.3) iiiiii YearscatchcatchYearsXprice εβββββ +++++= 43210 '*'')log(  
 
Where the log price of home i is a function of iX , a vector of internal 
characteristics; iYears' , a vector of fixed effects representing the year of the sale; 
iYearscatch '* , an interaction between year fixed effects and a catchment fixed 
effect which represents whether home i is inside the Penn Alexander catchment 
or not.  This is the variable of interest and can be interpreted as the average 
price premium associated with a home bought inside of the Penn Alexander 
catchment in a given year, relative to the baseline year and the control group.  In 
other words, these coefficients represent the average willingness to pay for a 
home with Penn Alexander access in a given year.  Finally, iε  is a residual error 
term, which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed.   
 
If the year by catchment fixed effects are statistically significant, the estimations 
they yield will help inform School Improvement District planning process because 
they represent how demand for the new amenity increases over time.  It also 
helps us to understand, unlike Analysis 1, how much home buyers are willing to 
pay for a high quality school in an area where one previously did not exist.  
Finally, the analysis provides the opportunity for cost/benefit calculations.  From 
a planning perspective, this understanding might help inform how much new 
economic activity a School Improvement District might generate given some 
amount of up-front investment.  This is especially important particularly if the 
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program asks households to voluntarily increase their own taxes to fund new 
school quality.     
 
These estimations along with those from Analysis 1 will be used for the School 
Improvement District feasibility study.  As discussed at length in Chapter 2, while 
home price appreciation and neighborhood revitalization are an important part of 
the School Improvement District – a successful feasibility study will hinge on 
whether Districts can plan for equity in the face of expected real estate 
appreciation. 
 
 
Analysis 3:  Planning School Improvement Districts 
 
This section describes a potential methodology Philadelphia could use to assess 
School Improvement District feasibility by way of a Geographic Information 
System (GIS)-based, land-use site suitability model161.  The basic workflow is to 
create spatial “decision factors” and then overlay them atop each other to create 
a ‘site suitability index’.  This yields a suitability score for each school catchment 
area citywide.  Narrowing the search to only the most suitable catchments, it then 
becomes possible to estimate how much additional tax revenue/burden would be 
generated if a School Improvement District was created. 
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 These methods are reviewed in Malczewski (2004). 
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The suitability analysis considers decisions factors that will likely lead to a 
positive electoral outcome for the District as well as ensuring economic and 
equitable development outcomes.  Each factor is encoded as a raster map – a 
cartographic representation not unlike a weather map where data is represented 
by an array of pixels or grid cells.  Individual factors are scaled such that each 
runs from 1-10 where a value of ‘10’ represents highest suitability.  This 
framework allows us to compare or overlay say, neighborhood income encoded 
in dollars with the supply of local vacant land encoded in units of density.  The 
scaling process allows for the possibility that planners may wish to weigh certain 
factors more than others while also ensuring that the final site suitability index is 
not skewed by any one decision factor.  Figure 4.4 illustrates the weighted 
overlay technique.   
 
Figure 4.4: The weighted overlay technique. 
 
Chapter 3 suggests planners can foster equity by redefining neighborhood 
boundaries and with them the supply of and demand for public services – 
services like education.  Creating entirely new school catchment “neighborhoods” 
is beyond the scope of this analysis, thus existing school catchment boundaries 
are used.  A map of catchments are overlaid atop the final site suitability index 
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and the average suitability score is calculated for each catchment.  Finally, the 
highest scoring catchments (defined as 5th quintile average suitability score) are 
used to estimate the amount of tax revenues/burdens that could be generated if 
we assume a School Improvement District raised residential property tax rates.  
The next section describes the motivation behind the individual decision factors 
used for this analysis. 
 
Decision factors 
 
The majority of the decision factors included in the analysis deal with equity.  
Chapter 3 suggests that a growth/equity balance can be achieved if planners 
either choose an income diverse area or actually manipulate the spatial bounds 
of a neighborhood in order to control the supply of and demand for public 
services.  The implications of drawing School Improvement District boundaries to 
include a mixed-income neighborhood extend to education achievement as well. 
 
Research presented in Technical Appendix 1 asks whether there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the number of students scoring proficient or 
advanced on math and reading test scores and racial diversity at the school 
level162.  The statistical models estimated in Technical Appendix 1 are robust, 
and conclude that a 10% increase in racial diversity, leads to roughly a 1.7% - 
2% increase in the number of students who score proficient or advanced on 
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 The analysis controls for other non-student neighborhood and school effects 
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standardized tests163.  These results suggest that planning a diverse School 
Improvement District is not only a good idea from an equity standpoint but from 
education productivity standpoint as well. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Decision Factors 
 
Each decision factor is summarized in table 4.1 above.   Decision factors 1-7 aim 
to capture racial and economic diversity at the neighborhood level.  Decision 
factor 1 is a racial ‘diversity index’ calculated at the Census block group level164.  
This index can be used not only to analyze how many Whites are in an area, but 
how the proportion of Whites compares with the proportion of other races as well.  
Decision factor 2 tries to get a sense of diversity not only for each individual block 
group but for each block group and its adjacent neighboring block groups.  This 
is referred to as the ‘spatial lag’ of diversity.   
 
                                                          
163
 These estimations should not be construed as causal in nature.  More information is provided in Technical Appendix 1. 
164
 More info on how the Diversity Index is calculated can be found in Technical Appendix 1.   
Decision 
Factor Name Encoding Description Scale Source
1 Diversity Diversity index by block group 1-10 Census
2 Lag of Diversity Mean of Diversity index by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors 1-10 Census
3 Middle Income Diversity of income deciles by block group 1 & 10 Census
4 Lag of Income Mean of Income by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors 1-10 Census
5 Middle Sale Price Forth through sixth family home sale price deciles by block groupt 1 & 10 OpenDataPhilly
6 St. Dev. Sale Price Standard Deviation of single family home sale prices by block group 1-10 OpenDataPhilly
7 Lag of Sale Price Mean of home price  by block group and its first order adjacent neighbors 1-10 OpenDataPhilly
8 Qualifed Census TractQualified census tract designation by tract 1 & 10 HUD
9 Vacant Land Kernel density of vacant land 1-10 PWD**
10 LIHTC Count of Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Units by block group 1-10 HUD
11 CDCs Distance to nearest neighborhood Community Development Corp. 1-10 PACDC*
12 Elementary Schools Distance to nearest elementary school 1-10 OpenDataPhilly
13 Children Under Age 9 Count of children under age 9 by block group 1-10 Census
* Philadelphia Association of Community Development Corporations
** Philadelphia Water Department
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Decision factor 3 is concerned with income diversity.  Ideally, we would have 
data on actual income breakdowns by block group so that we could calculate 
income diversity much like race above.  In lieu of these data, decision factor 3 is 
concerned with middle income (4th-6th deciles) block groups and decision factor 4 
takes the spatial lag of median household income.   
 
The next three decision factors use single-family home sale prices as proxy for 
economic diversity.  Decision factor 5 indicates middle priced neighborhoods (4th-
6th deciles); decision factor 6 is the lag of sale prices; and decision factor 7 is the 
standard deviation of home sale prices by block group.  This last factor gives a 
good indication of whether a neighborhood is contains economic diversity or not. 
 
Chapter 2 discussed the importance of affordable housing development, 
particularly the use of Low Income Housing Tax Credits which allocates housing 
subsidy to high poverty neighborhoods.  These ‘Qualified Census Tracts’ (QCT), 
are tracts where 50% of households have incomes 60% of the area median 
income.  Decision factor 8 includes areas that are inside QCTs or immediately 
adjacent to them.   
 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits cannot be used to cover land acquisition 
costs165, thus developers of tax credit housing, typically local community 
development non-profits, rely on the stock of vacant land.  Philadelphia has an 
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 Schwartz (2006). 
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abundance of vacant land166.  As ownership of land is a prerequisite when 
applying for tax credits, decision factor 9 describes the density of vacant land 
parcels throughout Philadelphia.  To get a sense of where existing affordable 
housing opportunities exist, decision factor 10 describes the current stock of Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits units in Philadelphia 
 
While land acquisition is important, of equal if not greater importance is the 
institutional knowledge required to put together a tax credit application – the 
“Qualified Allocation Plan”.  There are a handful of community non-profits in 
Philadelphia, many of which are neighborhood-based, that have a proven track 
record of successfully competing for tax credits.  While partnering with one of 
these groups is important for the development of affordable housing, it is also 
vital for administrative purposes as well.  Consider that a well-funded and well-
managed community non-profit has the experience and know-how to manage 
projects at the neighborhood as well as organize and advocate on the behalf of 
local residents.  An Improvement District is a non-profit entity that requires a 
small administrative staff.  It is in the best interest of the District to minimize 
administrative overhead by partnering with an existing non-profit to help reduce 
these costs.  As such, decision factor 11 considers the spatial location of 
community development non-profits in Philadelphia. 
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 By some estimates this stock includes 40,000 land parcels throughout Philadelphia (City of Philadelphia, 2014). 
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Decision factor 12 is about locating an appropriate school facility.  Although it 
may be feasible to float a bond toward the construction of a new school, the 
preferred option is the adaptive reuse of an existing school facility.  Decision 
factor 12 encodes the distance to the nearest elementary school.   
 
Finally, according to Pennsylvania's Neighborhood Improvement District 
legislation any proposed School Improvement District requires the consent of at 
least 60% of area property owners.  The suggests that proposed District 
boundaries must include residents who are likely to vote for the legislation  – in 
this case, families with school-aged children (Decision factor 13) – defined as the 
number of households with children under 9 years old.  Residents who do not fit 
this demographic profile are not likely to vote for a tax increase from which they 
receive no benefit.   
 
The last step uses parcel level tax assessment data to estimate how much 
revenues could be raised if the School Improvement District imposed a property 
tax increase of 0.25% moving rates from 1.34% to 1.59%.  This analysis shows 
the amount of new funds that could be raised for school improvement in total and 
the average additional tax burden for families living in a potential District.   
 
 
Analysis 4:  Interviews with experts 
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Although the site-suitability analysis is critical to the planning process, there are 
other important considerations that cannot be quantified.  This section outlines 
three interviews conducted with professionals whose experience is relevant for 
planning School Improvement Districts167.  A brief introduction is provided for 
each interviewee which is then followed by a list of questions.  Appendix 2 is a 
School Improvement District policy brief that was sent out to each interviewee.  
Appendix 3 includes the specific questions asked to each interviewee. 
 
Paul Levy, President & CEO, Center City District Philadelphia 
 
The Center City District is a non-profit Business Improvement District 
representing Philadelphia’s central business district.  Its revenues topped $20 
million in 2013.  Their expenditures range from streetscaping and public safety to 
marketing and research168.  They are currently servicing a $21 million bond, part 
of which is being used to finance Dilworth Park – a new, 120,000 square foot 
park bordering City Hall in the heart of downtown Philadelphia.  This organization 
is widely regarded as one of the largest and most comprehensive Business 
Improvement Districts in the world169 - and Paul Levy is at the helm.  There are 
likely few other experts anywhere in the U.S. who can speak better to the 
financing and administrative requirements of School Improvement Districts.  
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 Interviews were requested from four individuals but only three responded. 
168
 Center City District (2013) 
169
 Morcol (2010). 
77 
 
Dennis Culhane, Professor, Penn School of Social Work   
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the University of Pennsylvania conducted a large-
scale planning process for its West Philadelphia Initiatives program.  To assess 
the feasibility of a number of placed-based interventions including the Penn 
Alexander School, The Cartographic Modeling Lab led by Professor Dennis 
Culhane used data and analytics to predict the potential housing demand for the 
new school.  This interview discusses this planning process including strengths 
and weaknesses.  In addition, given the school’s success as a catalyst for 
neighborhood change, the interview will also ask if Professor Culhane could do it 
again, would he reformulate the plan to include additional equity. 
 
Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur 
 
Ivy Olesh is the president of one of the foremost “Friends of” groups in 
Philadelphia.  The Friends of Chester Arthur is a non-profit “committed to 
partnering with the staff, teachers and students (of Chester Arthur)…in order to 
foster a robust learning environment for neighborhood children170.”  This 
interview will focus on why these “Friends of” groups have proliferated in recent 
years and why neighborhood residents are willing to donate to their local school. 
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 Friends of Chester Arthur (2014). 
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Kira Strong, Vice President of Community and Economic Development, People’s 
Emergency Center (PEC) 
 
PEC is a community development non-profit located in the Mantua section of 
Philadelphia and Kira Strong is their Vice President of Community and Economic 
Development.  PEC’s service area makes it unique among Philadelphia’s many 
community developers.  While one in four housing units are vacant in Mantua 
and 98% of students at the local elementary school are designated low-
income171, its neighbor, Drexel University has been a catalyst for gentrification in 
recent years.  In the summer of 2014, Drexel announced that it plans to open a 
new public school which would serve Mantua in part.  For these reasons, PEC 
will emerge as a unique case study for how to plan for equity in the midst of 
growth.  Questions for Kira Strong deal exclusively with how affordable housing 
provision might make a real difference in the lives of local residents and school 
children in particular.  
 
This chapter introduced a comprehensive research design for estimating the 
willingness to pay for school quality in Philadelphia and how to harness this 
dynamic to plan School Improvement Districts.  Chapters 5 and 6 present and 
discuss the results of these research questions.    
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 Kilpatrick (2014).   
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CHAPTER 5: ESTIMATING THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR GOOD 
SCHOOLS 
 
Analysis 1: Estimating the willingness to pay for good schools in 
Philadelphia  
 
The objective of this analysis is that school quality as measured by test scores is 
a significant driver of home prices.  The research design suggests that this 
should be reflected as sharp discontinuities in home prices and test scores 
across school catchment boundaries.  
 
Before testing this hypothesis, it is useful to see if these patterns can be 
visualized.  To do so, a visualization is presented that (i) groups all home sales 
by their nearest boundaries; (ii) groups sales once again by whether they are on 
the “high” or “low” test score side of the boundary172; and lastly, (iii) averages 
sale prices over all “low-side” and “high-side” groups.  These two averages are 
visualized in Figure 5.1 below - the average difference between high and low 
side prices is roughly $10,000173 
 
This average price difference may be small in instances where “high” and “low” 
test scores are actually reflecting two relatively low test score school catchments 
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 These data include all years, adjusted for inflation.  Only catchment boundaries with test scores on either side are 
included. 
173
 Of course, in this form, additional controls are not included. 
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abutting one another.  To identify more interesting across-catchment differences, 
sales are further decomposed into test score quartiles as seen in Figure 5.2.  
Note column 4 displays price differences in instances where sale prices in first 
quartile test score catchments are directly compared to those in the fourth 
quartile.  Compare these results to column 1 which illustrates price differences 
when two first quartile catchments abut one another.  More generally, Figure 5.2 
shows that as quartile differences in test scores increase so do average price 
differences. 
 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 illustrate the possibility that comparatively low test scores 
differences on either side of catchment boundaries may depress the estimated 
home price effect from Equation 4.2.   
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Figure 5.1:  Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test score 
side of a catchment boundary. 
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Figure 5.2:  Home price differences for observations on either the high or low test score side of a catchment boundary broken 
out by test score quartiles. 
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Table 5.1 presents summary statistics for the entire dataset.  Unfortunately, 
Philadelphia assessor data is unreliable when it comes to hedonic variables like 
number of bedrooms, bathrooms and other measures of home quality.  Thus, it’s 
best to think of the below results not as ‘quality-adjusted’ but ‘size-adjusted’ 
estimations.  Table 5.2 presents the results estimated from the model in 
expression 4.2.  Each column represents a separate regression on subsets of 
observations for different distance bandwidths around the catchment boundary.  
Again, the assumption is that by restricting the regression to observations closer 
to the catchment boundary, one can separate test score effects from other non-
school amenity effects.   
 
Although catchment boundaries allow the model to account for spatial variation at 
very small spatial scales, it is possible that significance levels are being over-
inflated due to spatial autocorrelation.  Because memory allocation in standard 
statistical packages will not allow for the estimation of spatial regression and 
associated models with such large sample sizes and so many fixed effects, I rely 
on clustered standard errors (CSE) (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  The motivation for 
CSE is very similar to that of spatial autoregressive models in that it corrects for 
otherwise biased standard errors in instances where the data share hierarchical 
spatial dependencies.   
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Table 5.1:  Summary statistics. 
 
‘Reading test score’ is the variable of interest.  It is interpreted as the average 
home price premium associated with a specified increase in test scores.  This 
coefficient increases dramatically as observations farther from the catchment 
boundary are included.  In fact, the price premium nearly doubles between the 
500ft and the 1500ft regressions.  There are two reasons for this outcome and 
both are related to the fact test scores are the only reflection of catchment level 
variation in the model.  First, referring to Figure 4.2, consider that homes 1500 
feet from the boundary are practically in the center of the school catchment which 
means that the model is picking up effects that may have nothing to with 
catchment boundaries.  Second, consider how prices may differ for homes 
immediately adjacent to the boundary compared to homes each 1500 feet from 
the boundary – homes which may effectively be in two different neighborhoods.    
 
For the 500ft bandwidth, the model estimates the following relationships:  First, 
after controlling for housing attributes, years and catchment effects, school 
quality as measured by test scores has a statistically significant effect on home 
prices.  Second, the results estimate that a 100 point increase in test scores is 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Sale Year 72,518 2009.881 1.42 2,008 2,011
Sale Price 72,518 124,949.50 207,500.60 1,000 30,000,000
Frontage 72,518 2,146.11 19,333.81 0 4,937,200
Depth 72,518 8,122.15 9,183.73 0 1,031,700
Garage Dummy 72,518 0.362 0.481 0 1
Total Liveable Area 72,518 1,313.53 1,156.08 0 272,160
Reading Test Score 72,518 1,259.03 64.646 1,112 1,464
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expected to lead to a 4.58% increase in home prices which is $5,888 at the 2012 
mean home price of $126,644.  To put it another way, a one standard deviation 
shift in test scores – roughly 63 points in 2012, leads to a or 2.89% increase in 
home prices $3,660 increase in home prices at the 2012 mean.   
 
While there is of course a degree of uncertainty in these results, the 95% 
confidence bounds on this estimation suggest that the price premium could be as 
low as $5,262 or as high as $14,459 at the 2012 mean.  This relatively high 
upper bound suggests that homes in higher in higher quality school catchments 
can fetch a significantly higher home price premium.   
 
Finally, it should be noted that results for individual boundary effects have not be 
included in Table 5.2. Not only are they too numerous to list, but more 
importantly, their individual interpretations are not useful given our present 
research question.  However, from a spatial point of view, it is of interest to 
examine the pattern of statistically significant boundary effects – where jumps in 
housing prices are most substantial. To do so, each catchment boundary which 
is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) has been highlighted in Figure 5.3 
below.  Here the black lines represent statistically significant boundaries.  The 
northern boundary of the Penn Alexander catchment is a commercial corridor, 
and because of a reduced sample of home sales along that boundary, the model 
finds it statistically insignificant at the 0.05 level.   
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Significance codes:  ***p<0.01;  **p<0.05;  *p<0.1  
Exterior condition fixed effects are omitted for space. Standard errors are reported below coefficients. The 'felm' R package used to 
estimate this regression does not report an intercept. This package is expressly designed to estimate regressions with many fixed effects – 
hence its use.  Estimates are reported for clustered standard errors (CSE) at the neighborhood level.  When the same model is estimated 
without CSE, the total livable area variable is reported as significant at the 0.05 level. The non-significance here may have to do with 
historical development patterns - that is, if neighborhoods segment home types in to homogenous groups clustering standard errors in this 
way should decrease their overall statistical significance. 
Table 5.2:  Results estimated from the model in Equation 4.2 
500ft 750ft 1000ft 1250ft 1500ft
Total Liveable Area 0.0000298 0.0000411 0.0000477 0.0000531 0.0000573
0.0000263 0.0000353 0.0000395 0.0000435 0.0000465
Frontage 0.0000003 0 0.00000003 0.0000001 0.0000001
0.000001 0.0000001 0.0000001 0.0000001 0.0000002
Depth 0.0000041* 0.0000031** 0.0000031*** 0.0000031*** 0.0000033***
0.0000023 0.0000013 0.0000011 0.0000011 0.0000011
Garage Dummy 0.2065105*** 0.1998242*** 0.1969910*** 0.1929513*** 0.1907499***
0.0316825 0.0302367 0.027058 0.0259327 0.0259275
Sale Year (2009) -0.1124482*** -0.1119023*** -0.1174749*** -0.1126425*** -0.1097761***
0.0166661 0.0134783 0.0120855 0.0116743 0.0114842
Sale Year (2010) -0.1017444*** -0.1076550*** -0.1167053*** -0.1174039*** -0.1179258***
0.0201808 0.0167677 0.0159088 0.0155872 0.015719
Sale Year (2011) -0.1110404*** -0.1268929*** -0.1271880*** -0.1264679*** -0.1228530***
0.0233449 0.0208581 0.0221583 0.0209677 0.0223901
Sale Year (2012) -0.0979924*** -0.1017292*** -0.1040960*** -0.1073044*** -0.1094640***
0.0315415 0.0284266 0.0265719 0.0248543 0.0253191
Reading Test Score 0.0004576** 0.0005774** 0.0007021*** 0.0007867*** 0.0008605***
0.0002153 0.0002511 0.0002614 0.0002662 0.0002712
Observations 33,099 46,052 55,847 61,872 65,831
R2 0.5255314 0.5204444 0.5210495 0.5194824 0.517392
Adjusted R2 0.519301 0.5157547 0.5171502 0.5159541 0.5140629
Residual Std. Error 0.9204207 0.918482 0.9111492 0.9050261 0.9030642
Dependent variable: log of sale price
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Figure 5.3:  Statistically significant boundary fixed effects overlaid on mean test scores. 
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How do these results compare to other studies that have employed the same 
method?  Table 5.3 adopts a table from Black & Machin (2009), to show the 
results for four different cities around the world.  The results in Philadelphia are 
similar to those elsewhere, although it should be emphasized that the 
Philadelphia estimations are likely less bias in the sense that the model is 
estimated from observations within 500ft of the boundary.  Black (1999) uses 
observations within roughly 1,850 ft. of the boundary while Davidoff & Leigh 
(2008) use observations within nearly 3000 feet.  As previously mentioned, Table 
5.1 shows how volatile these estimates can be at distances beyond the 
immediate catchment boundary. 
 
Table 5.3:  Findings from other papers using similar research designs. 
 
The present analysis shows that there is a significant willingness to pay for 
quality schools in Philadelphia.  Although the model includes five years of test 
score and price data, the estimates are still cross-sectional in nature - which is to 
say that the model provides little insight in to how price premiums may have 
adjusted to the Philadelphia School District’s decline.  Figure 5.4 shows the 
pairwise regressions between mean single family home sale prices and mean 3rd 
grade reading test scores over the five years included in the analysis.  The 
increasing R-Squared values suggest that the price/test score relationship is 
Author Location Result
Black (1999) Boston, MA A 1 SD increase in school quality leads to a 5% increase in prices.
Davidoff & Leigh (2008) Australian Capital Territory, Australia A 1 SD increase in school quality leads to a 3.5% increase in prices.
Fiva & Kikeboen (2008) Oslo, Norway A 1 SD increase in school quality leads to a 1.5% increase in prices.
Fack & Grenet (2010) Paris, France A 1 SD increase in school quality leads to a 2% increase in prices.
89 
 
becoming sharper as more schools close and wealthier home buyers bid up 
prices in the few neighborhoods where good schools remain. 
 
As previously mentioned, willingness to pay for quality schooling as estimated in 
the above analysis is likely biased downward by the overall poor quality of 
schools Citywide.  In other words, the potentially significant price premiums 
associated with the City’s “best” schools may be overwhelmed by the relatively 
low average premiums across the entire City. Thus an alternative approach to 
estimating the price premiums associated with good schools would be to observe 
changes in home prices when a neighborhood is “shocked” by the introduction of 
a very high quality school. Penn Alexander is widely regarded by housing 
consumers to be such a school, and motivates our analysis of this case below. 
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 Figure 5.4:  Pairwise test score/home price regressions, 2008-2012  
 
 
Analysis 2: Estimating the willingness to pay for the Penn Alexander 
School 
 
The research design used to estimate the willingness to pay for the Penn 
Alexander School is similar in spirit to the one used to derive estimates Citywide.  
The difference is that unlike the Citywide case, this analysis provides an 
opportunity to understand how the housing market responds to the introduction of 
a good school where one previously did not exist.  This method is deemed to be 
more relevant for the financing and implementation of School Improvement 
Districts. 
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As in the Citywide case, it is the school catchment boundary that provides the 
means by which causal effects can be identified.  This boundary is not simply an 
historical artifact of household demand, nor a pre-existing attendance boundary 
that has been in place for several decades.  Rather, it represents a planned 
intervention that once enacted, proceeded to change the way in which 
households interacted with their community.  In the year before the school 
opened, students on either side of the catchment boundary did not go to 
separate schools.  Then suddenly, with the opening of Penn Alexander, students 
on one side of the boundary were permitted to attend the new University-
subsidized elementary school while their peers across the street were forced to 
remain at their previous institution. 
 
By visualizing the spatial and temporal pattern of home sale prices over time with 
respect to this catchment boundary, we can begin to see how it has become a 
significant dividing line between neighbors.  Figure 5.5 traces the annual 
movement of inflation-adjusted mean price per square foot of homes inside and 
outside of the Penn Alexander catchment by year.  Note that initially there is little 
difference between prices prior to the school's construction in the year 2000.  
However, while the overall trend for all prices throughout the study period is 
upward, prices inside of the catchment increased at a faster rate than those just 
outside.  More over, the continued separation of the two lines over time serves to 
underscore the strong effect that school’s introduction had on the local housing 
market. 
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Figure 5.6 plots inflation adjusted home sale prices as a function of distance to 
the catchment boundary by year (negative distances are outside of the 
catchment and positive distances are inside.  Each line represents associated 
regressions of prices on distances for each year.  Here again, we see that prices 
on either side of the boundary were roughly similar before the school opened, but 
diverged dramatically in subsequent years.  Notice that prices on either side of 
the boundary were roughly the same before and in the year the school opened.  
In the immediate years to follow however, prices diverged dramatically. 
 
Figure 5.5:  Mean price per square foot of home inside and outside the Penn Alexander 
catchment. Error bars represent the standard error around the mean price per square foot. 
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Figure 5.6:  Inflation adjusted home prices as a function of distance to the Penn Alexander 
catchment by year 
 
Table 5.4 displays the summary statistics for the data used in the regression 
portion of this analysis. 
 
 
Table 5.4:  Home prices as a function of distance to the Penn Alexander catchment by year 
 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Sale Year 1,070 2,005.09 3.184 2,000 2,011
Sale Price 1,070 246,452.00 173,077.30 1120 1,190,000
Frontage 1,070 2,005.86 816.336 1,200 11,000
Depth 1,070 9,404.91 2,467.89 2,200 20,800
Garage Dummy 1,070 0.255 0.438 0 2
Total Liveable Area 1,070 2,062.26 764.62 0 6,857
Distance to 
Catchment Boundary 1,070 524.365 299.66 33.31 1,068.49
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Table 5.5 presents the results of the regression described in Equation 4.3.  The 
variables of greatest interest are the year by catchment interaction effects which 
are interpreted as the average price premium associated with a home purchased 
inside of the Penn Alexander catchment in a given year, relative to the baseline 
year and the control group – where the baseline year is 2000 (a year before the 
school opened) and the control group includes those homes immediately outside 
of the catchment. 
 
Column 1 of Table 5.5 shows that in 2001, the year the school opened, there was 
little statistical difference in (non-transformed) prices on either side of the 
catchment relative to prices in 2000 – a year before the school opened.  From 
2002 onward, all year-by-catchment effects are statistically significant.  By 2011, 
on average, the Penn Alexander price premium is estimated to be on average, 
more than $132,000 – a statistically significant result that constitutes more than 
30% of the average in-catchment home price.   
 
The estimated price premiums are shown in Figure 5.7 along with their 95% 
confidence intervals.  While the interval widths are substantial, the degree of 
uncertainty may reflect the lack of individual housing attribute data used in the 
study.  Nevertheless, the overall trend in these results is still apparent.  Many of 
the year by catchment interactions using the log transformed prices lack 
statistical significance, but the 2011 coefficient suggests on average, a home 
inside the catchment sells for more than 48% than its neighbor outside the 
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catchment.  It also worth mentioning that while the larger U.S. housing market 
suffered dramatically in 2008, prices quickly leveled out in the Penn Alexander 
catchment suggesting that their may be a connection between quality education 
amenities and price resiliency. 
 
Figure 5.7:  Non-transformed annual price premium estimations and their 95% confidence 
intervals 
 
96 
 
 
Significance codes:  ***p<0.01;  **p<0.05;  *p<0.1  
Estimates are reported for clustered standard errors (CSE) at the tract level. Exterior condition and individual year fixed 
effects are omitted for space.  Year * catch represents an interaction between year & catchment fixed effects. Standard 
errors reported below coefficients. The 'felm' package used to estimate this regression does not report an intercept. 
Table 5.5: Results of the regression described in Equation 4.3 
No 
Transformation
Log 
Transformation
Total Liveable Area 86.92*** 0.0005399***
15.17548 0.00016
Frontage 24.52*** 0.00008
9.45222 0.00007
Depth 5.82** 0.0000673*
2.56762 0.00003
Garage Dummy 43,417*** 0.4193685***
16254.00000 0.10188
2001 * catch 12981.25000 0.4398805*
15465.30000 0.25739
2002 * catch 77,300*** 0.5969798***
20766.57000 0.20437
2003 * catch 64,154*** 0.5641461**
20066.06000 0.24330
2004 * catch 81,074** 0.6010603***
41160.55000 0.22108
2005 * catch 106,681*** 0.4273816**
32485.82000 0.21338
2006 * catch 96,428*** 0.4784539**
34437.55000 0.23726
2007 * catch 194,387*** 0.7334490***
25904.33000 0.25656
2008 * catch 125,6550*** -0.22402
39012.31000 0.56649
2009 * catch 130,505*** 0.5346393**
32993.26000 0.26974
2010 * catch 142,658*** 0.7338199**
20695.29000 0.29358
2011 * catch 132,366*** 0.3924133**
19814.61000 0.18635
Observations 1,065 1,065
R2 0.55 0.4
Adjusted R2 0.53 0.39
Residual Std. Error 117876 0.912179
Dependent variable: sale price
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These findings suggest that despite the Philadelphia School District’s ongoing 
fiscal hardship, households are still willing to pay a significant premium for 
housing in quality school catchments.  These results are likely driven by 
household preferences for quality schools and the unique agglomeration benefits 
associated with living in a city like Philadelphia.  Thus, it is possible that 
households from across the region are sorting into to the City to consume 
agglomeration benefits while subsequently bidding up prices for houses in the 
few quality school catchments that remain.   
 
The economic development implications of these results cannot be understated.  
As discussed in Chapter 3, The University of Pennsylvania spent $24 million on 
capital construction costs.  In addition, Penn provides a $1,330 subsidy for each 
one of their approximately 500 students.  Although the school opened in two 
phases, 2001 and 2004, assuming that the subsidy included all 500 students 
from 2001 to 2011, then Penn spent $665,000 per year and $7.315 million 
throughout the study period.  Combined with the costs for construction, the total 
cost of the school intervention was $31.315 million. 
 
There are 681 single family homes in the PAS catchment area.  Multiplied by the 
2011 price premium estimate of roughly $132,000 yields nearly a $90 million 
dollar benefit to the single-family home market (these numbers would be higher if 
the rental market was included).  According to this back-of-the-envelope 
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cost/benefit comparison, the estimated total benefit of the school tripled the 
University’s costs. 
 
This result suggests that perhaps policy makers may have overlooked school 
quality as an economic development mechanism in disinvested urban 
communities.  Chapter 6 uses these results as the primary motivation for School 
Improvement Districts. 
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CHAPTER 6: PLANNING SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS 
 
This chapter discusses how planners could successfully plan School 
Improvement Districts.  There are two sections.  The first is a largely data-driven 
process that involves the creation of cartographic decision factors which when 
overlaid generate a site suitability index.  This index is then used to identify the 
economic viability of School Improvement Districts across existing school 
catchments.  The second section further informs the planning process compiling 
and expounding on responses from local experts with experience managing 
organizations similar to School Improvement Districts. 
  
Data driven 
 
To begin, the decision factors outlined in Chapter 4 are each compiled and 
encoded as vector shapefiles.  Figure 6.1 visualizes these decision factors.  Most 
are derived from Census block groups and contain continuous values.  Examples 
include decision factor 1 (the Diversity Index) and decision factor 13 (the count of 
children under the age of 9).  Other factors like the Qualified Census Tracts are 
encoded with binary values – either a tract is “qualified” or not.  Finally, two 
decision factors are created from point geographies – Neighborhood CDC’s and 
Elementary Schools. 
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In order to enable the weighted overlay procedure, these vector decision factors 
are then encoded as raster maps.  These maps are displayed in Figure 6.2.  
Many of the variables that originated from block groups still resemble their vector 
appearance.  Note however that the point decision factors such as Neighborhood 
CDC’s and Elementary Schools are encoded so that every location on the map is 
represented by its distance to the nearest point (e.g. elementary school). 
 
Each raster decision factor shares the following qualities:  (i) all have the same 
number of pixels; (ii) all pixels share the same length and width dimensions; and 
(iii) all factors have values that range from ‘1’ through ‘10’.  This framework 
allows the set of decision factors to be perfectly overlaid atop one another and to 
perform simple mathematical operations on the entire “stack” of decision factors.  
In order to calculate the site suitability index, the following equation is used: 
 
Site suitability index = Diversity + Lag of Diversity + St. Dev. Sale Price + Lag of Sale Price + 
CDCs + LIHTC + Elementary Schools + Vacant Land + (Children Under Age 9 * 2) + (Middle Sale 
Price * 2) + (Middle Income * 2) 
 
 
In this example, three decision factors are weighted with twice as much influence 
as the other ten.  Weighting schemes can be left to the analyst’s discretion – as it 
is here.  Or, given the flexible nature of this analysis, it’s often useful to take this 
technology in front of a group of community stakeholders who can weigh the 
factors as they see fit, visualize the resulting suitability index and then reiterate.  
The results from the site suitability index calculate from the above equation are 
shown in Figure 6.3, along with the mean suitability score by school catchment.  
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Figure 6.1: Site suitability decision factors in vector GIS form  
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Figure 6.2: Site suitability decision factors in raster GIS form  
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Figure 6.3: Final site suitability index and mean index by school catchment 
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The final site suitability analysis suggests that the low/medium scoring areas 
include Philadelphia’s central business district, the University City neighborhood 
(where the Penn Alexander School is located) and other more wealthy sections 
of the city in the northwest and northeast.  Figure 6.4 shows the top quintile 
school catchments with respect to their site suitability score.   
 
 
Figure 6.4: Most suitable school catchments (5th Quintile) 
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Once the most suitable areas have been delineated, the City’s tax assessment 
data can be used to calculate how much additional tax revenue can be expected 
from a School Improvement District in a given catchment, and how much of an 
increased tax burden this might mean for local homeowners.  In this scenario, we 
assume that the School Improvement District brings with it an additional millage 
of 0.25%, increasing the real estate tax rate from 1.35% to 1.59%.  Tax 
assessment data is publically available in Philadelphia, and it includes assessed 
values for all residential properties Citywide.  These data were joined to the 
school catchments and used to calculate the statistics shown in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Estimated new tax revenues/burdens generated from most suitable school 
catchments (5th Quintile) 
ES_Short
Site 
Suitability 
Score
Area of 
Catchment 
(ft^2)
Number 
of 
Taxable 
Units
Total 
Assessed 
Value
Average 
Assessed 
Value
Standard 
Deviation 
Assessed 
Value
Total Tax 
Rateables 
at 1.34%
Total Tax 
Rateables 
at 1.59%
Total 
Difference 
in Rateables 
Btwn. 1.34% 
& 1.59%
Avg. Tax 
Contributio
n per 
Household 
(@ 1.34%)
Avg. Tax 
Contribution 
per 
Household 
(@ 1.59%)
Total per 
Household 
Difference 
in 
Rateables 
Btwn. 1.34% 
& 1.59%
Marshall, T. 119 6565959.1 1188 98,942,900 83,285 12,615 1,325,835 1,573,192 247,357 1,116 1,324 208
Hopkinson 114 6781236.4 1871 146,770,000 78,445 10,617 1,966,718 2,333,643 366,925 1,051 1,247 196
Ferguson 111 8072900.5 1072 72,596,200 67,720 23,836 972,789 1,154,280 181,491 907 1,077 169
Morrison 111 6888875.1 1724 132,637,200 76,936 12,389 1,777,338 2,108,931 331,593 1,031 1,223 192
Smedley 110 10548590 2414 174,841,400 72,428 16,898 2,342,875 2,779,978 437,104 971 1,152 181
Kirkbride 109 3552076.2 1759 319,456,100 181,612 37,358 4,280,712 5,079,352 798,640 2,434 2,888 454
Moffet 109 10333313 1635 182,557,700 111,656 56,858 2,446,273 2,902,667 456,394 1,496 1,775 279
Barton 109 33583266 4219 329,723,000 78,152 11,728 4,418,288 5,242,596 824,308 1,047 1,243 195
Olney ES 108 12163170 2088 206,602,700 98,948 18,583 2,768,476 3,284,983 516,507 1,326 1,573 247
Meade 108 10225674 887 94,782,000 106,857 49,243 1,270,079 1,507,034 236,955 1,432 1,699 267
Brown, H A 107 6458320.4 1523 101,068,600 66,362 31,094 1,354,319 1,606,991 252,672 889 1,055 166
Webster 105 24649256 3158 190,635,100 60,366 16,829 2,554,510 3,031,098 476,588 809 960 151
Willard 105 11194422 2656 115,314,300 43,417 12,596 1,545,212 1,833,497 288,286 582 690 109
Belmont 104 5489572.4 960 58,903,400 61,358 37,464 789,306 936,564 147,259 822 976 153
Catherine 104 15499969 2282 147,976,700 64,845 19,993 1,982,888 2,352,830 369,942 869 1,031 162
Edmunds, H. 102 17329826 3036 362,286,000 119,330 35,040 4,854,632 5,760,347 905,715 1,599 1,897 298
McMichael 102 6027765.7 1432 143,328,000 100,089 67,356 1,920,595 2,278,915 358,320 1,341 1,591 250
Birney 101 8288177.9 1588 149,670,900 94,251 22,492 2,005,590 2,379,767 374,177 1,263 1,499 236
Key 101 3552076.2 2114 241,626,900 114,298 22,493 3,237,800 3,841,868 604,067 1,532 1,817 286
Hamilton 101 5274295 1428 98,799,200 69,187 14,529 1,323,909 1,570,907 246,998 927 1,100 173
McDaniel 101 10440951 4588 323,845,300 70,585 23,672 4,339,527 5,149,140 809,613 946 1,122 176
Solis-Cohen 101 12486086 3647 452,165,500 123,983 10,083 6,059,018 7,189,431 1,130,414 1,661 1,971 310
Cayuga 100 8826371.2 1724 96,244,700 55,826 8,879 1,289,679 1,530,291 240,612 748 888 140
Juniata Park 99 21958289 2719 253,202,700 93,123 13,084 3,392,916 4,025,923 633,007 1,248 1,481 233
Carnell 99 23572870 5158 514,595,400 99,766 18,067 6,895,578 8,182,067 1,286,489 1,337 1,586 249
Marshall, J. 99 22173567 1355 107,614,600 79,420 28,928 1,442,036 1,711,072 269,037 1,064 1,263 199
Stanton, E M 99 5381933.7 2152 539,785,700 250,830 152,340 7,233,128 8,582,593 1,349,464 3,361 3,988 627
Childs 98 5812488.4 2767 281,405,400 101,701 33,797 3,770,832 4,474,346 703,514 1,363 1,617 254
Taylor 98 9041648.6 1838 93,633,300 50,943 16,792 1,254,686 1,488,769 234,083 683 810 127
Creighton 98 24649256 1780 169,187,600 95,049 9,787 2,267,114 2,690,083 422,969 1,274 1,511 238
Locke 98 16683994 1712 176,214,300 102,929 71,259 2,361,272 2,801,807 440,536 1,379 1,637 257
Welsh 97 3767353.6 869 45,499,500 52,358 16,894 609,693 723,442 113,749 702 832 131
Fulton 97 11409699 1375 159,860,800 116,262 48,258 2,142,135 2,541,787 399,652 1,558 1,849 291
Kelly, John 97 30031190 3531 372,317,000 105,442 41,591 4,989,048 5,919,840 930,793 1,413 1,677 264
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The column labeled ‘Total Difference in Rateables Btwn. 1.34% and 1.59%’ gives 
an estimate of how much new property tax revenue could be generated for 
District use.  While these numbers range dramatically, a useful benchmark is 
provided by the Penn Alexander case, where the University of Pennsylvania 
contributes $1,330 for each of the Penn Alexander School’s students.  This 
means that the school is able to raise an additional $665,000 annually.  Table 6.1 
shows that 9 of the 34 schools listed could potentially raise that much in the way 
of new funds in its first year of operation.  These results suggest that within the 
context of the present analysis, School Improvement Districts are at least 
economically feasible in Philadelphia. 
 
The column labeled ‘Total per Household Difference in Rateables Btwn. 1.34% 
and 1.59%’ provides an estimate of the average per household tax burden 
increase.  Recall that one of the key factors involved in the planning of School 
Improvement Districts is that they would straddle lower and middle income 
neighborhoods.  If this condition is met, then the actual tax burden would vary 
considerably depending on the value of a given home in a given catchment.  For 
households with school age children, these modest additional tax burdens should 
not be enough to dissuade them from approving a School Improvement District.  
If the District is successful, the additional capitalization benefits would also prove 
enticing. 
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The Penn Alexander case shows that introducing new school quality where it did 
not previously exist can lead to dramatic growth in local land and housing prices.  
It is worth pointing out some distinctions however, between the Penn Alexander 
case and School Improvement Districts.  In the Penn Alexander case, 
households do not pay for the additional school quality – the University of 
Pennsylvania does.  Thus, the value (an estimated $132,000) that home buyers 
place on the school is directly capitalized into home values.  This same 
capitalization effect could not be expected for the School Improvement District 
case because any positive school quality capitalization effect will be partially 
offset by the negative capitalization of a tax increase.   
 
Aside from the work of Oates (1969)174, there appear to be no attempts in the 
literature to estimate in a general sense, the negative capitalization effect 
associated with a tax increase.  This difficulty may stem from the fact that tax 
rates are endogenous with both public service provision and home prices.  
Nevertheless, we can expect that prices (and therefore District revenues) will 
increase over time along with demand for in-District housing.  Unfortunately, our 
inability to estimate these capitalization effects, makes it difficult to quantify such 
increases.  It is likely however, that if these Districts are planned adequately 
using these and other strategies as discussed above, the economic multipliers 
(for both in-District residents and the City at-large) associated with School 
                                                          
174
 Oates estimates negative capitalization rate associated with an increase in taxes without an equilibrium increase in 
public service provision.  He does so at the state level, and outside the context of a natural or quasi-experiment. 
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Improvement Districts should vastly outweigh the costs associated with any 
marginal tax increase.   
 
Experience driven 
 
To create a successful comprehensive plan for School Improvement Districts, 
concerns must be addressed at three spatial levels: The first is the neighborhood 
where planners must draw the boundaries of the Improvement District to raise 
enough new tax revenue, ensure an appropriate residential economic mix, and 
also provide enough housing such that the demand for the school does not 
eventually outweigh the supply of classroom seats.  The second level is District 
administration.  While these schools are managed by broader municipal school 
districts, administrators at the city level are ill-prepared to market, manage and 
oversee an Improvement District.  Thus, the comprehensive plan must consider 
the most effective and efficient to way to administer School Improvement 
Districts.  The final level is the school where new funds will be invested.  
Although this dissertation does provide some literature on school reform 
strategies particularly in cities, the preference for a given reform strategy and its 
consequent execution is more the expertise of educators rather than planners.  
Having said, this chapter is closed with some more general thoughts about how 
District revenues might be expended. 
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Penn Alexander was among the first examples of placed-based school 
interventions at the elementary level and as such it provides an important 
blueprint for planning School Improvement Districts.  Although, it is important to 
remember that Penn Alexander was heavily subsidized by a University and not 
neighborhood residents, there are important lessons to be learned when it comes 
to comprehensive planning.  For one, although getting the neighborhood on 
board with the new school was a requirement for the University of Pennsylvania, 
University administrators prioritized community feedback.  Dennis Culhane, a 
professor who led much of the planning for the school recalls “closed-door 
meeting among senior administrators”, which later expanded to established 
neighborhood non-profits and finally the broader community175.  Culhane recalls 
census data on school-age children was used to model the “population 
composition that might result” from Penn Alexander, but made no direct mention 
about how the school catchment boundary was delineated.   
 
Since equity plays such an important role in the School Improvement District 
framework, I asked Culhane if affordable housing was considered during the 
planning stage.  Since the neighborhood had experienced had such high rates of 
vacancy, he explained, there was not a lot of concern over affordable housing or 
residential displacement.  In fact, Culhane notes, “the more explicit goal was to 
get people moving into the neighborhood and investing in it, not to preserve 
affordability.”   
                                                          
175
 Culhane (2014). 
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Eventually, toward year two and three of the program, attention did turn to the 
preservation of affordable rental housing.  “The idea”, Culhane said, “was and is 
to hold onto a significant enough share of the rental market and to sit on the 
rents…, so as to put downward pressure on other rental properties.”  This idea 
clearly draws a parallel to the strategy of going after Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits before School Improvement District capitalization effects really begin to 
take hold.   
 
It is interesting to consider how far Philadelphia has come since the 1990s when 
the Penn Alexander School was first being planned.  Today, equity and limiting 
residential displacement is a major policy concern within the City’s affordable 
development community.  I asked Culhane whether or not University officials 
back then were concerned over residential displacement.  He responded: 
 
“Not really.  The vacancy rate…was so significant in the West Philadelphia 
area, and the need for middle class and professional families so great for 
the tax base, that I don't think people seriously thought that Philadelphia 
would be experiencing displacement.  So, I don't think there was a sense, 
other than through (affordable rental program), that there was much of a 
moral compulsion to worry about price increases.  Most people saw that 
increased values, including out west of University City would increase 
wealth and asset growth among working class families, and it did…It was 
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probably the first time in decades that people had equity with which to 
draw upon for improving their homes.  
 
It is clear that the University was acutely aware that the provision of quality 
schooling amenities would catalyze neighborhood economic development, 
although it is interesting that displacement seemed a non-issue at the time.  
Since then, as Chapter makes clear, Penn’s intervention has increased housing 
costs dramatically.   
 
Two important lessons emerge from the School Improvement District planning 
process. First, given the magnitude increase in neighborhood demand 
associated with providing school quality where it previously did not exist, it is vital 
that affordable housing be constructed, not three years into the intervention but 
well before the school first opens its doors.  In the Penn Alexander case, the 
University has the financial wherewithal to step in and purchase rental housing to 
set aside as affordable.  In the School Improvement District case, planners must 
develop affordable housing while land prices are still at their pre-revitalization 
levels.  This is because subsidies like the Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
program can only be used in low-income communities.  The takeaway is clear – 
invest in affordable housing before the neighborhood appreciates in value.   
 
The second takeaway is that an initial, bounded, placed-based investment 
ensures hyper-local economic multipliers.  If planners wish to ensure that these 
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multipliers are equitably distributed, they’re going to have pay great attention to 
how the boundaries of these interventions are initially demarcated.  Great detail 
and attention will have to paid to the planning, development and administration of 
School Improvement Districts to ensure both productive and equitable outcomes.   
 
The democratic nature of Improvement Districts – the idea that a majority vote 
among neighborhood residents is needed for passage, requires that District 
administrators plan, advertise and meet with residents in an effort to court 
potential voters.  The organization responsible for School Improvement District 
administration is going to have to be persuasive in order to convince households, 
even those with school age children to vote to increase their own taxes.  Paul 
Levy, President of the Center City District, Philadelphia’s Business Improvement 
District (BID) recalls the time when he had to initially convince voters of the tax 
increase benefits.  He told me, “it’s all about self-enlightened interest…Are you 
willing to pay x dollars more per week to receive the direct benefits of your 
payment to the District176?” 
 
If business is the target of a BID, then promising cleaner/safer streets and 
business marketing is a benefit that all commercial entities inside the BID can 
take advantage of.  However, schooling is a service that a disproportionate 
number of residents will value directly.  Everyone else must be convinced to vote 
for the District solely on the argument that new school quality will bring with it 
                                                          
176
 Levy (2015) 
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increased home values.  Levy’s greatest concern is that residents will complain 
that they pay enough taxes already – and that despite the fact that 55% of their 
tax dollars currently go to schools, most schools have largely failed.   
 
Only a coordinated and well-financed advocacy campaign and comprehensive 
planning process can overcome this sentiment.  When asked what he thought 
was the greatest administrative concern for starting a small Improvement District, 
Levy was quick to point out that someone has to “fund the upfront planning, 
analysis, outreach and communications stage”.  This means that foundation 
support will likely be needed to fund the creation of a 501(c)(3).  As this new 
organization begins to plan and meet with communities, it must decide how it is 
going to expend new revenues.  In this regard, Levy made an interesting point 
that the greatest draw for taxpayers would be to fund “external curb appeal 
improvements, because that way everyone benefits from an upgrade in the 
neighborhood, even those without kids.”  A playground might be a good example 
of an improvement that the whole neighborhood could benefit from. 
 
In contrast, Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur (FoCA) 
elementary school disagrees with Levy.  Although, this “Friends of” non-profit 
raised $150,000 from corporate and individual donations to build a new 
playground, funding improvements inside of the school is equally important, she 
argues.  As discussed in Chapter 2, these “Friends of” groups represent an 
innovative approach to school financing and likely the closest cousin to School 
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Improvement Districts among comparable placed-based interventions.  When 
asked what the organization’s purpose is, Olesh replied: 
 
“FoCA is an all-volunteer 501(c)(3)…formed by…community members to 
support Arthur, a public, K-8 school…FoCA aims to raise money for 
Arthur...(It) has a proven track record of being a good steward of finds to 
ensure that everything raised is going to support the programs and 
initiatives critical to Arthur’s success…(FoCA also) helps the school 
market it successes to the large community around Arthur177.” 
 
I asked Olesh why she thought that these “Friends of” groups had proliferated in 
recent years.  She said they have a low barrier for entry but that they can affect 
key changes on micro levels.  Not that raising thousands of dollars for external 
improvements to the school does not represent important change, but I was more 
curious about how an external group could finance internal change particularly 
given the fact that her group has no agency within the School District of 
Philadelphia.  Olesh pointed out that to her, the two most important value-added 
drivers of school quality are a good principal and great teachers, both of which 
her group influenced.  When one principal retired, Olesh sat on the selection 
committee providing input on a replacement.  FoCA, Olesh claims, “funds 
teacher projects - bringing in programs that support the work they do and 
hopefully making their jobs a bit easier.”  Working one on one with the principal 
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and teachers to fund targeted professional development might be an interesting 
avenue for a School Improvement District.  There is experimental evidence to 
suggest, as documented in Chapter 2, that improving teacher quality, particularly 
in the early childhood years, can provide important value-added benefits to a 
child’s education. 
 
It would be interesting to conduct a survey of parents in a potential School 
Improvement District to discover which interventions, either internal or external 
they would be more willing to fund with their tax dollars.  Of course, what 
differentiates “Friends of” groups from Improvement Districts, is that donations to 
the former is voluntary while tax payments to the latter would be required by law.  
Notably, many who donate to FoCA do not have school-aged children.  Olesh 
claims that residents who donate do so because they are either “happy to see 
good things happening for (Philadelphia schools); want their kids to be able to 
attend the school; already have kids there; want their home prices to rise; or want 
more residents to move into the neighborhood.”  Clearly, there is a diversity of 
motivations for residents to donate to the school.  Among all these reasons, 
however, Olesh points out that people are willing to donate because “we have a 
neighborhood catchment.”  She relays an anecdote where a parent’s group from 
a Philadelphia high school asked her to come and speak about how FoCA 
fundraises because the high school group was “struggling to engage 
stakeholders”.  This high school accepts students from across the city and is not 
therefore, anchored to their local neighborhood as Chester Arthur is.   
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Parents who donate to Chester Arthur realize that their investment catalyzes 
additional neighborhood effects, while donations to an unanchored high school 
yields none.  If this understanding is innate among homeowners, then it will 
surely be easier to convince voters of the efficacy of School Improvement 
District.   
 
The School Improvement District planning process is vital to the success of this 
program.  The quantitative approaches outlined in this chapter can help as first 
pass – a filter, to highlight areas in the City where residents may be more inclined 
to vote for a District and where, at least economically, it has the greatest chance 
of succeeding.  This exercise however, does not help overcome the massive 
political hurdle confronting the successful implementation of these Districts – 
namely the attitude that “I already pay property tax for schools! Why should I pay 
more?”  It is hard to argue with this logic.  In a city like Philadelphia, where the 
School District runs massive deficits and begs for bailouts from both the City and 
the State, why should anyone believe that more money will truly make a 
difference?  I touch more on this point in the concluding chapter.    
 
In the end, I’m not sure which will be the greatest selling point: That children will 
receive a better education or that the value of housing assets will increase over 
time.  Given the direct relationship between home values and tax liabilities, 
planners will have to come up with a clear and concise presentation that informs 
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homeowners not only of the potential home appreciation but also how they can 
leverage their assets to make additional investments in their own future. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
When a member of the audience at the 2014 Education Research Association’s 
annual conference asked Mark Gleason, the Executive Director of the 
Philadelphia School Partnership (PSP), why Philadelphia public schools don’t get 
the funds they need, he responded emphatically, “Because it’s not about the 
funds!178”  Gleason’s organization, PSP, finances talent-centric approaches to 
education reform – developing high quality teachers and better assessment tools, 
among other strategies179.  Their goal is to raise $100 million dollars to invest in 
the expansion, transformation and opening of high quality schools in 
Philadelphia180.   
 
The argument that Gleason was underscoring was that taxpayers should not 
invest their limited financial resources in schools that have significant structural 
failures.  The problem with this argument however, is that it confounds the issue 
of financing with a host of other structural failures discussed in Chapter 2 
including poverty-induced negative peer effects or a lack of value-added quality 
such as good teachers.  One can argue that investing in Philadelphia schools is a 
sunk cost fallacy but how can one really discern the true cause of failure if the 
schools can’t even afford to fund nurses and assistant principals?  Poverty likely 
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makes it more costly to educate a student from an impoverished neighborhood 
than a student who comes from a suburb.   
 
While Gleason himself might lament the role of financing, the actions of his 
organization suggests otherwise.  In the winter of 2015, PSP offered the School 
District of Philadelphia $35 million to lessen the financial burden of adding new 
charters to the portfolio of schools in Philadelphia181.  As described in Chapter 2, 
this money would go to offset fixed costs that remain on the District’s books when 
a student moves from a District school to a charter.  Examples might include 
teacher salaries or the maintenance of school buildings.  PSP’s offer proved 
contentious in the run up to a meeting of the School Reform Commission, whose 
job it was, as the state-mandated administrator of the Philadelphia School 
District, to vote yea or nay on applications for 39 new charter schools182.  Facing 
pressure from a mostly Republican state legislature to approve the new charters 
and pressure from Philadelphia school reformers to oppose, the School Reform 
Commission ultimately approved 5 of the 39 charter applicants183.  A little more 
than a week later, Pennsylvania’s recently elected Democratic governor, Tom 
Wolf ousted Bill Green from his position as chair of the School Reform 
Commission.  The governor cited as his motivation, Green’s support for 
additional charters184. 
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This anecdote – the latest in a saga, makes it apparent that school financing is 
critical and has implications well beyond the education of Philadelphia’s children.  
If the financing situation remains as is and Philadelphia has to rely solely on City 
resources, the likely outcome is that traditional public schools will close in all but 
the most well off neighborhoods (like that which surrounds the Penn Alexander 
School); charters will proliferate in their place; and if these schools do not prove a 
better alternative than District schools, human capital growth in Philadelphia will 
continue to languish.  Of course, as this dissertation makes clear, there are wide-
ranging economic implications as well. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, at a national level, lackluster education outcomes 
have significant negative repercussions for future earnings potential.  At a city 
level – and in particularly for cities that rely on growing talent at home in addition 
to attracting it from abroad, an under-educated workforce will inhibit productivity 
otherwise associated with strong agglomeration economies.  Finally, at the 
neighborhood level, as mentioned Chapter 1, low education has a negative 
feedback effect – where low quality schools yield ill-prepared students who go on 
to earn disproportionally lower wages and then have no choice but to live in 
disadvantaged neighborhoods with poor quality schools.     
 
This dissertation demonstrates that school quality is a public good that can have 
a tremendous impact on neighborhoods.  The answer to research question one 
regarding the willingness to pay for quality schools is an emphatic “yes”.  Chapter 
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5 shows how investment in quality schools where this quality previously did not 
exist can be a major catalyst for neighborhood economic development.  One of 
the principal conclusions of this research is that school quality is one of the 
greatest untapped economic development tools available to cities.   
 
Increasing the level of school financing at the neighborhood level may be one 
strategy for saving traditional public education while providing a new opportunity 
to foster local economic development.  While commitments from external 
organizations like universities or “Friends of” groups are welcome, a more 
systematic approach from cities will be required in order improve both 
neighborhoods and schools. 
 
One potential source of new property tax revenue is to rely on the changing 
preferences for urban living that has encouraged many middle class families to 
return to city neighborhoods.  While gentrification represents a market approach 
for raising additional revenue, it is unlikely to lead to equity.  A second option is 
for planners to harness their knowledge of comprehensive planning, 
neighborhood planning and public finance to rewire the “circuits” that underlie the 
economic relationships in neighborhoods.   
 
Chapter 2 discusses at length, the relationship between the financing of local 
public goods and the spatial organization of cities and neighborhoods in the U.S.  
It is argued that ‘neighborhood choice’ is the principal driver of segregation and 
122 
 
perpetuated urban poverty and how fiscal zoning and high housing costs are 
used to lock out low-income residents in suburbs and cities respectively.  It 
suggests that given the persistent within-neighborhood clustering of economic 
and social characteristics, planners must redefine the boundaries of 
neighborhoods in order to equitably distribute public goods to a wide range of 
income levels. 
 
If low-income neighborhoods yield relatively lower property tax revenues from 
which services like schools are financed, and the opposite is true for higher-
income neighborhoods, then allow adjacent rich and poor neighborhoods to pool 
their property taxes to jointly fund public goods.  At some (yet unknown) 
neighborhood size and ratio of rich and poor households, the following outcomes 
may be achievable:  First, newly generated tax revenues can support a 
noticeable upgrade in public services.  Second, when the new public services are 
capitalized into home prices, there will already be a large enough supply of 
affordable housing to effectively temper displacement pressures.  Finally, 
because property taxes are a function of home prices, new tax liabilities would be 
equitably distributed across all rungs of the income ladder.  In addition to these 
features, there is also ample opportunity for additional equity to be created by 
focusing affordable housing subsidies in these places as well.  I discuss a variety 
of these programs in Chapter 2 and argue that affordable housing subsidies 
could have the greatest impact if they’re used to construct housing on land that is 
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inexpensive today but will appreciate in the future in the face of new housing 
demand.  
 
Improvement Districts are one option that planners could use to rewire 
neighborhoods in order to finance new school quality and the equitable 
revitalization of neighborhoods.  There is no reason that Improvement Districts 
should only be used in downtowns and commercial corridors to bolster demand 
for local businesses.  It could be repurposed to support any number of public 
services like parks, local transit or even job-training.  It is the program’s electoral 
requirement that makes it appealing but also makes it politically difficult to 
achieve. 
 
There is another placed-based program that is worth mentioning as an 
alternative to School Improvement Districts.  Tax-increment financing (TIF) 
allows cities to float a bond for neighborhood improvement and then repay the 
debt over time using the incremental increase in property taxes generated by the 
improvements.  The School Improvement District planning process and the 
spatial structure of the program could both easily be adopted to fund ‘School 
TIFs’.  While these two programs would be very similar in most respects, what 
really sets them apart, aside from how they raise new revenues, is the political 
process underlying their authorization. 
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While Neighborhood Improvement Districts in Pennsylvania require the consent 
60% of neighborhood tax payers, tax-increment financing schemes require the 
consent of city officials – namely City Council.  At first glance, it may appear that 
TIFs are easier to enact because they require fewer yea votes.  Except, in a city 
like Philadelphia, where each council person is the master of their own 
councilmanic domain, one council person is unlikely to authorize new citywide 
debt obligations to support a project outside of their own district.  While the 60% 
hurdle for Improvement Districts appears steep, outside council members are 
unable to meddle in the electoral process. 
 
Comprehensive planning, like the process described in Chapter 6 can play a 
critical role in mitigating the political hurdles that might come with the 
Improvement District electoral process.  Planning is about the conception, 
evaluation and advocacy of placed-based interventions - an all-encompassing 
exercise that extends far beyond mere urban design.  It’s about understanding 
how people interact with the intangible, non-built environment characteristics of 
places.  It’s about how they value certain public goods and how they translate 
this valuation into a willingness to consume a place.  Hopefully this dissertation 
has demonstrated a particular and applied use of these dynamics to plan a new 
and unique program.  Nevertheless, it is much more difficult to plan for situations 
where the quality of these intangibles change and these placed-based dynamics 
shift over time.  In these instances, planners have largely failed thus far, to put 
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forth viable strategies that provide equity in the face of gentrification.  Look no 
further than New York City and San Francisco as evidence of this fact. 
 
If gentrification is the new norm, then in order to alleviate concerns of 
displacement, planners have two options:  First, they can topple regulatory 
barriers and NIMBY objections to ensure that the supply of housing keeps up 
with demand.  This is the market-oriented approach.  The second option is for 
planners to rewire neighborhoods in order to alter the supply of and demand for 
local public goods.  This will likely help create a range of affordability options and 
limit displacement in the face of new neighborhood investment.  This strategy 
can be coupled with traditional affordable housing schemes and to ensure better 
outcomes for low-income residents, officials should forecast neighborhood 
change and then construct affordable housing today in neighborhoods that will 
appreciate in the future.  
 
Planners must develop new ideas for cities experiencing rapid growth.  Decades 
after suburban living became the norm, planners now curse low-density living 
and struggle to find ways to retrofit suburbs to make them more inclusive and 
efficient.  If the planning community fails to address shifting demand for urban 
living, then they should expect to feel the same sort of remorse three or four 
decades from now.  Capital is mobile and the market will always allocate it to 
places where the potential for a return is greatest.  This shift marks a rare 
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opportunity to capture this capital and reinvest it toward the betterment of those 
less fortunate among us.  
127 
 
APPENDIX 1: SCHOOL OUTCOMES & RACIAL DIVERSITY 
 
This appendix asks whether there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the number of students scoring proficient or advanced on math and 
reading test scores and student racial diversity at the school level controlling for 
other non-student neighborhood and school effects.   
The data comes from the School District of Philadelphia’s Open Data Initiative185 
and includes standardized test scores in reading and math for the school year 
2011-2012.  The data include a percentage breakdown of race, data on 
enrollment and truancy, special education services and percentage of the student 
body classified as low-income.  A school zip code is provided which can help 
control for across neighborhood differences.  The largest source of omitted 
variation in the data is at the teacher level.   
 
The empirical strategy attempts to identify the role of diversity by estimating a 
series of regressions with varying controls.  Diversity is defined in using the 
Simpson’s D statistic which was developed for quantifying species diversity in 
ecosystems186.  The statistic is formalized as follows: 
 
 = 1 − ∑( − 1)	(	 − 1)  
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Where N represents the total number of species (or in this case students), and n 
represents the count of students per race.  Simpson’s D is scaled between ‘0’ 
and ‘1’ where a value of ‘1’ represents the highest level of diversity.  The School 
District does not report raw counts of students by race, just percentages, 
therefore the diversity measure is per 100 students.  For each school, students 
are broken down into 6 separate categories: African American, White, Asian, 
Latino, Pacific Islander and American Indian.  Figure T.1.1 displays the 
distribution of D for all schools.  Figure T.1.2 displays the distribution of 
percentage white.  Figure T.1.3 displays the spatial distribution of school 
diversity. 
 
Comparing across Figures T.1.1 and T.1.2, it becomes clear that the diversity 
statistic is describing more than just the number of white students in a given 
school.  Percentage white is included as a robustness test for the models below.   
 
 
Figure T.1.1: Histogram of school diversity for school year 2011-2012 
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Figure T.1.2: Histogram of percent white for school year 2011-2012 
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 Figure T.1.3: Spatial distribution of Diversity (D) statistic for elementary schools in 
Philadelphia 
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Data 
 
The data consists of 236 non-charter, elementary, middle and high schools from 
around Philadelphia in the year 2011- 2012.  Table T.1.1 provides summary 
statistics 
 
There are two dependent variables in the below regressions.  ‘readingScore’ and 
‘mathScore’ describe the percentage of students who scored proficient or 
advanced on Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) reading and 
math tests respectively.  The PSSA is Pennsylvania’s standardized assessment 
test187.  The School District aggregates test score data to the school level 
averaged for all students in a school regardless of whether they took the test in 
the 3rd, 8th or 11th grades.  Figures T.1.4 and T.1.5 display the distribution of math 
and reading scores respectively for the 2011-2012 school year.  Although both 
variables exhibit a normal tendency, reading scores are clearly more left skewed. 
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Table T.1.1: Summary statistics for school year 2011-2012 
 
Figure T.1.4: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA math tests, 
2011-2012 
 
Statistic Description N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES
Percent of students 
receiving special education 
services
236 13.995 5.911 0.9 30.4
SCH_ESOL_SERVICES
Percent of students 
receiving english language 
services
236 6.969 8.292 0 39
SCH_ATTENDANCE Percent of registered 
student in attendence 236 93.812 3.569 77.4 98.5
SCH_ENROLLMENT Total enrollment 236 577.992 356.398 176 3,110
SCH_STUDENT_ENTERED
Total number of students 
entering at the start of the 
year
236 22.962 17.982 0 93
SCH_STUDENT_WITHDREW
Total number of students 
who withdrew by the end of 
the year
236 21.356 19.857 0 157
readingScore
Percentage of students 
who scored proficient or 
advanced on PSSA tests
236 44.462 19.133 12 98
mathScore
Percentage of students 
who scored proficient of 
advanced on PSSA tests
236 48.407 20.142 8 99
AFRICAN_AMERICAN Percentage of African American students 236 61.71 32.287 1.2 89.3
WHITE Percentage of White 
students 236 12.64 19.158 0 56.3
ASIAN Percentage of Asian 
students 236 5.867 9.865 0 93
LATINO Percentage of Latino 
students 236 16.182 21.361 0 0
PACIFIC_ISLANDER Percentage of Pacific Islander students 236 0 0 0 0
AMERICAN_INDIAN Percentage of American Indian students 236 0 0 0 95.8
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY Percentage of low income 
students 236 82.317 13.182 45.4 0.799
Diversity Diversity D statistic 236 0.381 0.25 0.02 1
Elem Elemenarty school fixed 
effect 236 0.682 0.467 0 1
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Figure T.1.5: Distribution of percent scoring proficient or advanced on PSSA reading tests, 
2011-2012 
 
 
Methods 
 
To test the hypothesis that racial diversity plays a statistically significant role in 
school outcomes, several versions of the following regression is estimated: 
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where Score is the percent of students across each school, i, who scored either 
proficient or advanced on the PSSA reading or math test; SpecialEd and ESL are 
the number of students in school, i, who receive special education and English as 
a second language services respectively; Enroll is the number of students in 
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school, i, who are registered to attend that school; LowInc is the percentage of 
students who qualify as low-income; Attend is the attendance of students in school, 
i, reported as a percentage; Elem is an elementary school fixed effect; 
∑ ()()*)+ is a vector of zip code fixed effects; and Diversity is the coefficient of 
interest, representing the D statistic as described above. In later specifications, as 
a robustness test, Diversity is replaced with percent non-white. 
 
The motivation of the research design is to identify diversity effects while holding 
constant as many possible confounders as the data allow.  Many of the included 
variables deal with school level variation – chief among them is the low income 
control.  The zip code fixed effects are included to account for across neighborhood 
effects. 
  
For each outcome, a total of eight regressions are estimated beginning with the 
diversity variable and then adding additional controls in subsequent regressions.  
The hope is that the estimated coefficient on Diversity stabilizes as more controls 
are added. 
 
Results 
 
Tables T.1.2 and T.1.3 present regression outputs for reading and math scores 
respectively.  The linear combination of independent variables explain nearly 80% 
of the variation in the percentage of students who score proficient or advanced on 
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the PSSA reading test.  All coefficient signs appear reasonable.  Figure T.1.6 
presents a residual vs. predicted plot for regression 8 (with zip code fixed effects).  
This plot suggests that it is unlikely that any systematic variation has been omitted 
from the model. 
 
The interpretation for the latter two regressions (with and without zip code fixed 
effects respectively) is that all else equal, a 10% increase in the diversity D statistic, 
leads to roughly a 1.7% - 2% increase in the number of students who score 
proficient or advanced on the test188.  This result is statistically significant.  
Entrance of the zip code fixed effects renders the special education and school 
enrollment variables insignificant, but they also decrease the coefficient on the 
percent low income variable as expected. 
 
With respect to the math score regressions, the linear combination of independent 
variables explain nearly 74% of the variation in the percentage of students who 
score proficient or advanced on the PSSA math test.  Figure T.1.7 presents a 
residual vs. predicted plot for regression 8 (with zip code fixed effects).  Like the 
reading score regression, this plot suggests that it is unlikely that any systematic 
variation has been omitted from the model. 
 
The interpretation of the latter two regressions suggest that all else equal, a 10% 
increase in the diversity D statistic leads to a roughly a 1.6% - 1.8% increase in the 
                                                          
188
 Although all variables are untransformed, the data are in percentages, hence the interpretation is as well.  
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number of students who score proficient or advanced on the test.  These results 
are statistically significant.   
 
As a check for robustness, Tables T.1.4 and T.1.5 rerun the regressions 
substituting the diversity variable for percent white.  The models explain 74% and 
78% in the number students scoring proficient or advanced on reading and math 
tests respectively.  For the reading and math tests regressions, all else equal, a 
10% increase in percent white leads to roughly a 1.6% and 1.9% increase in the 
number of students who score proficient or advanced on the test.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This analysis presented here asks whether school racial diversity is correlated with 
the percentage of students who score proficient or advanced on test outcomes.  
Attempting to identify the diversity effect using a series of school level controls 
gathered from an open dataset provided by the Philadelphia School District, this 
analysis finds that racial diversity has a marginal yet statistically significant positive 
effect on outcomes.   
 
Surprisingly, percent white also leads to a marginal response to the percentage of 
students scoring proficient or advanced on tests189.     
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These results are cross-sectional and correlative in nature and should not be 
interpreted as causal – particularly considering that these tests ignore the form and 
function of potential school-level peer effects.  However, they do provide additional 
motivation for the School Improvement District concept.  Namely, that drawing 
District boundaries to include a diverse mix of students may improve outcomes 
across the board.   
 
It would be ideal to rerun these tests focused not on racial diversity but income 
diversity, although these data are not released by the School District.  Despite the 
unavailability of these data, both the low-income and neighborhood variables are 
important controls in the analysis presented here. 
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Table T.1.2: Regression summary for reading scores 
 
Dependent Variable: Reading Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8†
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES -0.303** -0.122
-0.119 -0.14
SCH_ESOL_SERVICES -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.273**
-0.089 -0.088 -0.118
SCH_ATTENDANCE 2.544*** 2.463*** 2.174*** 2.386***
-0.229 -0.226 -0.251 -0.283
SCH_ENROLLMENT -0.011*** -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.003
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Elem 3.592** 2.526 -8.116*** -7.387*** -7.496*** -0.850***
-1.656 -1.602 -1.611 -1.597 -1.579 -0.094
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY -1.057*** -1.084*** -1.106*** -0.797*** -0.750*** -0.745*** -6.905***
-0.063 -0.064 -0.061 -0.057 -0.058 -0.057 -1.775
Diversity 0.328*** 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.159*** 0.106*** 0.167*** 0.173*** 0.202***
-0.045 -0.033 -0.033 -0.034 -0.028 -0.033 -0.033 -0.063
Constant 31.959*** 127.373*** 127.284*** 133.873*** -124.585*** -121.923*** -90.376*** -115.439***
-2.054 -5.859 -5.814 -5.744 -23.73 -23.288 -26.132 -29.831
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
R2 0.185 0.63 0.638 0.669 0.785 0.794 0.799 0.83
Adjusted R2 0.181 0.627 0.633 0.663 0.78 0.788 0.793 0.784
Residual Std. Error 17.312 11.682 11.591 11.102 8.976 8.803 8.699 8.887
F Statistic 53.018*** 198.653*** 136.110*** 116.747*** 167.535*** 146.841*** 129.812*** 18.082***
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0   Standard errors listed below each coefficient
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Table T.1.3: Regression summary for math scores 
 
 
Figure T.1.6: Residual vs. predicted plot for Reading Score regression 8 (with zip code 
fixed effects) 
Dependent Variable: Math Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8†
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES -0.088 0.177
-0.142 -0.161
SCH_ESOL_SERVICES 0.032 0.032 0.042
-0.105 -0.105 -0.135
SCH_ATTENDANCE 2.829*** 2.838*** 2.754*** 3.018***
-0.264 -0.266 -0.299 -0.324
SCH_ENROLLMENT
-0.012*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
Elem 14.190*** 12.984*** 1.15 1.069 1.037 2.331
-1.884 -1.824 -1.856 -1.879 -1.883 -2.035
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY
-0.876*** -0.985*** -1.011*** -0.666*** -0.671*** -0.670*** -0.918***
-0.079 -0.073 -0.07 -0.066 -0.068 -0.068 -0.108
Diversity 0.357*** 0.173*** 0.164*** 0.225*** 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.161*** 0.180**
-0.047 -0.042 -0.037 -0.038 -0.032 -0.039 -0.039 -0.072
Constant 34.822*** 113.966*** 113.617*** 121.074*** -166.329*** -166.628*** -157.446*** -179.730***
-2.146 -7.363 -6.614 -6.538 -27.339 -27.411 -31.167 -34.198
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
R2 0.197 0.473 0.577 0.613 0.742 0.742 0.743 0.799
Adjusted R2 0.193 0.469 0.571 0.606 0.736 0.735 0.735 0.744
Residual Std. Error 18.091) 14.679 13.187 12.636 10.341 10.362 10.376 10.188
F Statistic 57.317*** 104.724*** 105.433*** 91.523*** 132.307*** 109.836*** 93.948*** 14.670*** 
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0   Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted
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Figure T.1.7: Residual vs. predicted plot for Math Score regression 8 (with zip code fixed 
effects) 
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Table T.1.4: Regression summary for reading scores using percent white as coefficient of 
interest 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Reading Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8†
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES -0.337*** -0.177
-0.123 -0.142
SCH_ESOL_SERVICES -0.031 -0.022 -0.034
-0.074 -0.073 -0.121
SCH_ATTENDANCE 2.769*** 2.770*** 2.467*** 2.551***
-0.227 -0.228 -0.25 -0.282
SCH_ENROLLMENT -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Elem 3.286* 2.583 -9.455*** -9.395*** -9.687*** -8.606***
-1.701 -1.682 -1.644 -1.654 -1.634 -1.851
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY -1.042*** -1.080*** -1.115*** -0.702*** -0.699*** -0.680*** -0.814***
-0.074 -0.076 -0.076 -0.068 -0.069 -0.068 -0.108
WHITE 0.549*** 0.106** 0.091* 0.099* 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.161*** 0.163**
-0.055 -0.051 -0.052 -0.051 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.074
Constant 37.528*** 128.878*** 129.956*** 137.314*** -151.829*** -152.094*** -119.888*** -124.945***
-1.25 -6.585 -6.57 -6.831 -24.338 -24.39 -26.771 -30.787
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
R2 0.302 0.621 0.627 0.643 0.783 0.783 0.79 0.825
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.618 0.622 0.637 0.778 0.777 0.784 0.778
Residual Std. Error 16.022 11.829 11.76 11.528 9.009 9.025 8.899 9.016
F Statistic 101.094*** 190.893*** 129.999*** 104.076*** 165.997*** 137.862*** 122.595*** 17.464***
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0   Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted
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Table T.1.5: Regression summary for math scores using percent white as coefficient of 
interest 
  
Dependent Variable: Math Score
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8†
SCH_SPEC_ED_SERVICES -0.145 0.121
-0.143 -0.161
SCH_ESOL_SERVICES 0.270*** 0.274*** 0.286**
-0.085 -0.085 -0.137
SCH_ATTENDANCE 3.169*** 3.160*** 3.029*** 3.168***
-0.266 -0.261 -0.291 -0.32
SCH_ENROLLMENT -0.007*** -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
-0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
Elem 13.724*** 13.024*** -0.753 -1.28 -1.407 0.499
-1.961 -1.95 -1.922 -1.893 -1.897 -2.096
SCH_LOW_INCOME_FAMILY -0.823*** -0.981*** -1.016*** -0.543*** -0.566*** -0.558*** -0.846***
-0.094 -0.088 -0.088 -0.08 -0.079 -0.079 -0.122
WHITE 0.555*** 0.206*** 0.140** 0.148** 0.198*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 0.194**
-0.058 -0.064 -0.059 -0.059 -0.046 -0.046 -0.046 -0.084
Constant 41.391*** 113.524*** 118.022*** 125.346*** -205.560*** -203.246*** -189.324*** -191.999***
-1.338 -8.288 -7.574 -7.92 -28.449 -27.916 -31.07 -34.875
Observations 236 236 236 236 236 236 236 236
R2 0.279 0.458 0.553 0.567 0.732 0.744 0.745 0.798
Adjusted R2 0.276 0.454 0.547 0.56 0.727 0.737 0.737 0.743
Residual Std. Error 17.143 14.888 13.557 13.365 10.53 10.329 10.328 10.214
F Statistic 90.413*** 98.579*** 95.587*** 75.682*** 125.960*** 110.765*** 95.107*** 14.579*** 
Significance: * .01; **.001; ***0   Standard errors listed below each coefficient
†Coefficients for zip code fixed effects are omitted
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APPENDIX 2: SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT DISTRICTS POLICY BRIEF 
 
Summary: 
 
Philadelphia’s public schools are wrestling with the realities of fiscal insolvency.  
To close a $400 million deficit, the City recently closed 23 schools and laid off 
nearly 20% of the total District workforce.  While the human capital repercussions 
will be felt for generations to come, there will also be significant neighborhood 
economic impacts as well.  The research accompanying this project concludes 
emphatically that despite Philadelphia being a school quality ‘desert’, good 
schools still fetch a premium and great schools have the power to transform a 
neighborhood.   
 
This document briefly outlines the motivation and design of an original program 
idea called School Improvement Districts – bounded areas whose residents vote 
to increase their own taxes and use the incremental increase to fund new school 
quality in their own neighborhoods.  While the program is placed-based and thus 
intended to be used as a tool for neighborhood development, a principle focus on 
equity will ensure that vital human capital spillovers are generated as well. 
  
Motivation: 
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The charter school movement in Philadelphia will continue to gain momentum 
and the exodus from District schools will hasten particularly in the wake of recent 
state legislation.  The economics of this transformation will further degrade 
school quality by forcing the District to mitigate its fixed costs by issuing more 
layoffs and closing more schools.  Although at face value, charters are not poor 
alternatives, unlike New York and Chicago which saw charter growth as a means 
of education innovation, in Philadelphia, their emergence is mainly in response to 
market forces. 
 
Why is this a problem for neighborhoods?  District schools are anchored to local 
neighborhoods - thus a decline in District school demand will lead to a 
corresponding decline in neighborhood demand.  If we capitalize on this 
mechanism but in reverse, the question becomes – can we leverage demand for 
schools, particularly in “gentrifying” neighborhoods, to foster positive human 
capital and neighborhood economic development outcomes.  Can this be done 
equitably? 
  
Supporting research: 
 
How might we identify the extent to which schools play a role in neighborhood 
demand?  The research that accompanies this project estimates the willingness 
to pay for public schools by Philadelphia home buyers by way of a quasi-
experiment – relating (in a regression framework)  differences in test scores with 
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differences in home prices for home sales on either immediate side of school 
attendance catchments.  This framework can identify school related home price 
premiums separate from other non-school neighborhood amenities.   
 
In Philadelphia, despite the current school crisis and a portfolio of under-
performing schools, a one standard deviation increase in test scores leads to 
nearly a 3% increase in home prices on average.  In addition to the citywide 
analysis, this research also tested the local economic development effects of 
introducing a high-quality school in a neighborhood that previously lacked school 
quality.  Using the University-subsidized, Penn Alexander School as a case 
study, a decade after the school’s debut, the research estimates that the average 
home buyer was willing to pay a 40% (nearly $140k) home price premium to 
purchase a house in the school’s attendance catchment. 
 
These results suggest that good schools can be a major driver of economic 
development in Philadelphia. 
 
Policy Description: 
 
The Improvement District mechanism is used to fund increased service provision 
typically in downtowns toward the benefit of local business.  In 2000, 
Pennsylvania enacted legislation approving ‘Neighborhood Improvement 
Districts’ suggesting that, “…taxes many times are not sufficient to provide 
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adequate municipal services…"  and that, "municipalities should be encouraged 
to create, where feasible…assessment-based neighborhood improvement 
districts…” administered by, “…district management associations…that promote 
and enhance more attractive and safer…neighborhoods; economic growth; 
increased employment opportunities; and improved commercial, industrial, 
business districts and business climates."  It is believed that this legislation 
provides the legal framework to support School Improvement Districts. 
 
School Improvement Districts would allow local residents to vote to increase their 
own taxes and put the incremental difference toward their local school.  It is 
envisioned that these Districts would be managed by a local community 
development non-profit that has the experience and staff to manage such an 
entity.  Because the new school quality will be capitalized into local home prices, 
this program must be accompanied by a series of equity interventions that will 
encourage housing affordability.  The most important means to achieve equity is 
to draw the District boundary to encompass a mixed-income neighborhood which 
would give planners greater control over the supply of and demand for public 
services like schools.  Although the Improvement District tax rate is flat, the tax is 
made more progressive by the fact that the tax liability is a function of home 
price.  Thus, the tax liability of lower valued homes will be less than that on 
higher valued homes.  Although all in-District residents will receive an equal 
share of the new school quality, the costs will be more equitably distributed.  The 
second major equity component would use the promise of new school quality to 
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win low income housing tax credits which can then be used to build affordable 
housing in the neighborhood before the new school drives economic and 
demographic neighborhood change and possible displacement. 
  
Conclusion 
 
Education is routinely seen as the most important mechanism for elevating 
children out of poverty.  It is incumbent upon planners to break the negative 
feedback cycle where low quality schools yield ill-prepared students who grow up 
to earn disproportionally lower wages and are forced to live in disadvantaged 
neighborhoods with low-quality schools.  To incentivize officials to adopt policies 
effective in this regard, the proposed program considers schools not only as 
drivers of human capital development but as engines of economic development 
as well.  School Improvement Districts may provide one policy mechanism to 
bolster education outcomes while simultaneously driving the equitable 
revitalization of neighborhoods.  
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APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Dennis Culhane, Professor, Penn School of Social Work   
 
1.  What did the West Philadelphia Initiatives planning process entail?   
2.  Was affordable housing development considered a component of the plan? 
Why or why not? 
3.  How did you project future housing demand in the neighborhood? 
4.  Did University officials ever consider the possibility that the intervention could 
lead to residential displacement? 
5.  Did any city officials (politicians or otherwise) express any concern over the 
University exerting its considerable financial might to revitalize the 
neighborhood? 
6.  What was the response of local residents and did this response vary 
according to the resident’s class or race? 
7.  What are the lessons that we can learn from Penn Alexander when trying to 
plan similar interventions in other neighborhoods? 
 
Paul Levy, President & CEO, Center City District Philadelphia 
 
1.  Are you ever asked by businesses who pay the Improvement District tax if 
they can opt out?  What is their motivation and how do you address their 
concerns? 
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2.  How have you been successful in convincing Improvement District taxpayers 
that the services Center City District provides help make a difference? 
3.  Talk about the “marketing” process that helped convince local businesses to 
vote for the Improvement District legislation. 
4.  Who sets the District tax rate?  How often does this change?  
5.  How did you make the move in 2009 from charging only businesses to 
charging residents as well? 
6.  How are budget expenditure decisions made? 
7.  Do you think the Improvement District model can be adopted to fund schools? 
If so, what are the key considerations? 
8.  What are the administrative concerns particularly as it relates to starting a 
small Improvement District?  
 
Ivy Olesh, President of the Friends of Chester Arthur 
 
1.  What is the purpose of the Friends of Chester Arthur? 
2.  Why do you think that these “Friends of” groups have grown in popularity in 
recent years? 
2.  How do you convince both parents and non-parents to donate?  Do any 
neighborhood businesses donate? 
3.  Is the free-rider problem ever an issue? 
4.  Who/by what process are budgetary decisions made? 
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5.  Do neighborhood residents ever express concerns over equity? What are 
they? 
6.  What drivers of school quality cannot be paid for by the Friends of group but 
instrumental in the success of Chester Arthur? 
7.  Do you think the majority of residents would vote to make their donations 
more formal in the form of a tax increase? 
8.  Do you think the success of the school has spilled over into other aspects of 
the neighborhood economy? If so, what? 
 
Kira Strong, Vice President of Community and Economic Development, 
People’s Emergency Center (PEC) 
 
1.  To what do you owe the success of your affordable housing programs? 
2.  Does PEC have a comprehensive plan in place to address equity? What are 
the specifics? 
3.  How do you leverage the encroaching University-driven neighborhood change 
when applying for Low Income Housing Tax Credits? 
4.  Discuss the extent of PEC’s partnership with Drexel University? 
5.  Would an organization like PEC (given the appropriate funding) make an 
adequate home for District administration? 
6.  Do you consider education (of any kind) to play an important role in 
community development? 
7.  How do you plan to provide equity in the face of Drexel’s new school given the 
Penn Alexander story? 
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